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Fair use is one of modern law’s most fascinating and troubling doctrines. It is 
amorphous and vague, as well as notoriously difficult to apply. It is, at the same 
time, vitally important in copyright and perhaps the most frequently raised and lit-
igated issue in the law of intellectual property. 
This Article synthesizes themes from the rich literature on fair use to fashion a 
novel theory of fair use that provides both a better understanding of the underlying 
principles and better tools for applying the doctrine. 
In contrast to the dominant understanding of fair use in the literature—that 
fair use addresses market failures—the Article proposes that fair use is a tool that 
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allocates a large bloc of uses directly to the public in order to limit the size of property 
rights that are granted to authors. The fair use doctrine, we argue, is an integral 
part of copyright’s sorting mechanism for, on the one hand, granting authors intel-
lectual property rights based on their expected incentives for creation and, on the 
other hand, granting the public privileges based on the expected utility from direct 
allocation. The Article’s theory thus accords with recent Supreme Court cases by con-
ceptualizing fair use not as an exception for costly transactions, but rather as a cen-
tral feature of the copyright system that ensures productive and allocative efficiency. 
This theory supports a reconceptualization of the basic structure of copyright 
law that both broadens fair use and makes the doctrine easier to apply. This Article 
favors a prima facie finding of fair use whenever the user’s category of use is one that 
produces widespread follow-on utility to nonusers (such as the categories of political 
speech or what we call “truth seeking”). This prima facie finding can be defeated 
only by showing that allowing such uses with respect to the particular copyrighted 
work would eliminate sufficient incentives for its creation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fair use is one of modern law’s most fascinating and trou-
bling doctrines. It is amorphous and vague, and it is notoriously 
difficult to apply.1 At the same time, fair use is vitally important 
in copyright. The fair use defense to copyright infringement is 
perhaps the most frequently raised and litigated defense in the 
law of intellectual property.2 While fair use appears as the first in 
a series of defenses and mandatory licenses in the Copyright Act 
of 1976,3 it is seen as much more than that. Fair use is a keystone 
of the law of copyright; the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated 
that fair use is a constitutionally mandated limitation on copy-
right in order to avoid conflicts between the First Amendment’s 
free speech protections and the monopoly rights copyright owners 
receive over expressions.4 
Yet scholars have struggled to explain why and how fair use 
should work. Following Professor Wendy Gordon’s immensely in-
fluential article, the most dominant theory of fair use is inextri-
cably related to the notion of market failure.5 The market-failure 
approach argues that the fair use doctrine is best understood as 
a mechanism for enabling the use of copyrighted works without 
authorization when the cost of transacting to obtain the authori-
zation is prohibitive and would block voluntary transactions.6 
Fair use, in other words, is a doctrine for small uses—those on 
which the user and owner would agree but for the high cost of 
locating one another and negotiating an agreement. Gordon has 
since significantly developed her own positions on fair use,7 but 
 
 1 See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 NC L Rev 1087, 1093–95 (2007); 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 
U Pa L Rev 549, 551–53 (2008). 
 2 Paul Siegel, Communication Law in America 237 (Rowman & Littlefield 2014). 
See also David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 L & 
Contemp Probs 263, 266–67 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 3 Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, codified as amended at 17 USC § 101 et seq. For 
the statutory section on fair use, see 17 USC § 107. 
 4 See, for example, Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 219–20 (2003) (describing fair 
use as a “built-in First Amendment accommodation[ ]”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v 
Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 555–60 (1985) (describing the “First Amendment protec-
tions . . . embodied in . . . the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded 
by fair use”). 
 5 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600 (1982). 
 6 See generally id. 
 7 See generally, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law 
of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Part of the Story, 50 J Copyright Society 
USA 149 (2003) (describing the specific instances when market failure should justify a 
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the ingenious explanation in her original article has captured the 
field.8 Unfortunately, the now-standard justification suffers from 
several troubling features that have been only partly addressed 
by subsequent writings. 
One problem with the market-failure explanation is descrip-
tive. The market-failure theory characterizes fair use as an excep-
tion to—even an anomaly within—the rule that copyright owners 
have the right to charge for all uses (unless, of course, transaction 
costs prevent them from doing so). This diverges from judicial un-
derstandings of fair use that have made fair use central to the 
constitutional balance between copyright and free speech.9 This 
gap between the market-failure theory and the perceived judicial 
importance of fair use is likely to become more pronounced over 
time. As technology lowers transaction costs,10 there is less reason 
to recognize fair uses, dooming the market-failure explanation of 
fair use to eternal contraction. 
A second, and more fundamental, problem with the market-
failure theory is conceptual. As we show, the market-failure theory 
implicitly presumes that the efficient economic strategy for allo-
cating copyright rights is to grant them in their entirety to the 
 
finding of fair use); Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Res-
ponse to Professor Lunney, 82 BU L Rev 1031 (2002) (describing how the original market-
failure test for fair use has been misinterpreted as a mechanism to limit fair use). 
 8 For some illustrative examples of the application of this framework, see generally 
Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U Colo L Rev 53 
(2014); Christina Chung, Note, Holy Fandom, Batman! Commercial Fan Works, Fair Use, 
and the Economics of Complements and Market Failure, 19 BU J Sci & Tech L 367 (2013); 
Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem, 27 Berkeley 
Tech L J 1379 (2012); Ryan Kairalla, Work as Weapon, Author as Target: Why Parodies 
That Target Authors (Not Just Their Works) Should Be Fair Uses, 2 NYU J Intel Prop & 
Enter L 227 (2012); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 Ohio St L J 47 (2012); Lydia 
Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright 
Permission Systems, 5 J Intel Prop L 1 (1997). 
 9 See Sarl Louis Feraud International v Viewfinder, Inc, 489 F3d 474, 482 (2d Cir 
2007) (discussing how fair use “balances the competing interests of the copyright laws and 
the First Amendment”); Eldred, 537 US at 220 (noting that fair use doctrine is one of 
copyright’s “traditional First Amendment safeguards”); A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc, 
239 F3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir 2001) (“We note that First Amendment concerns in copyright 
are allayed by the presence of the fair use doctrine.”); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc v Com-
line Business Data, Inc, 166 F3d 65, 74–75 (2d Cir 1999) (“First Amendment concerns 
[relating to copyright injunctions] are protected by and coextensive with fair use doc-
trine.”); Maxtone-Graham v Burtchaell, 631 F Supp 1432, 1435 (SDNY 1986) (“To satisfy 
[ ] First Amendment requirements, [c]ourts have mitigated the chilling effects of copyright 
law upon free expression . . . by developing . . . Fair Use.”). 
 10 Claudio U. Ciborra, Teams, Markets and Systems: Business Innovation and Infor-
mation Technology 74–76 (Cambridge 1993). See also generally Antonio Cordella, Trans-
action Costs and Information Systems: Does IT Add Up?, 21 J Info Tech 195 (2006). 
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author. However, we show that, for intellectual property, produc-
tive efficiency may be best ensured by allocating many use privi-
leges directly to users. Indeed, the most efficient allocation of copy-
right includes the grant of fair use privileges to users even when 
transactions for such uses would not fall prey to market failure.11 
In this Article, we offer a novel theory of fair use based on 
this insight into the effects of allocation on productive efficiency 
and societal welfare. Our theory provides a basis for a robust fair 
use doctrine that protects the public interest in free speech and 
maintains the incentive structure of copyright law that is vital to 
the creation of expressive works. It has the added benefit of re-
ducing, though not entirely eliminating, the ambiguity that has 
attended fair use cases since the doctrine’s inception. 
Rejecting the conventional wisdom on fair use, we claim that 
copyright law should be viewed as granting not one, but two large 
blocs of legal protections: a grant of fair use privileges to the pub-
lic and a grant of exclusive rights to authors. The grant of exclu-
sive rights to authors (such as the rights to copy, distribute, and 
display) is intended to give authors the ability to profit enough 
from their expressions to make it worthwhile for them to continue 
creating.12 The grant of fair use privileges to the public, by con-
trast, is intended to expand use of the creations by giving the pub-
lic the privilege of utilizing creative expressions for uses that cre-
ate significant follow-on utility for nonusers (such as political 
speech and truth seeking).13 Thus, fair use is not simply an allo-
cation of rights for minor uses. It is a grant of privileges as fun-
damentally important to the aims of copyright as the grant of 
rights to the author. In our conception, one should not look at fair 
use privileges as simply residual or carved out from authors’ 
rights. It is just as valid to view authors’ rights as residual or 
carved out from the fair use privilege. 
This dual grant of rights to authors and privileges to users is 
designed to meet the dual goals of incentivizing authors to create 
works and encouraging efficient use of works by users. Unfortu-
nately, the dual constitutional aims of incentivizing creation of 
 
 11 See generally Glynn S. Lunney Jr, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 
82 BU L Rev 975 (2002). 
 12 Justin Hughes, Fair Use across Time, 50 UCLA L Rev 775, 797 (2003); Joseph P. 
Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 Mich L Rev 409, 428 (2002); Stewart E. Sterk, 
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich L Rev 1197, 1198–1204 (1996). 
 13 The terminology of rights and privileges is taken from the classic typology of Pro-
fessor Wesley Hohfeld. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L J 16 (1913). 
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new works and ensuring their use by the public exist in some ten-
sion. Each grant of rights to the author of a copyrighted work ex-
pands the domain of rights enjoyed by the copyright owner (in-
creasing incentives) while simultaneously restricting the use 
privileges of the public in that same expression. Likewise, each 
grant of privileges to users increases the use of works while curb-
ing the value of incentives granted to the authors. In deciding 
whether to grant any particular right to authors, lawmakers must 
take account of this double effect, balancing the positive effect of 
the increased marginal incentives for authors that are created by 
the grant with the negative effect of the losses of public use of the 
expression in accordance with the right. Conversely, each grant 
of a privilege to the public to use otherwise-protected expressions 
requires lawmakers to balance in the opposite direction: the priv-
ilege expands public use at the expense of marginal incentive ef-
fects for creation. 
An important predicate of our theory is that incentivizing cre-
ativity does not necessitate granting all possible exclusive rights 
to authors in perpetuity. Granting this package to authors would 
actually result in a net social loss.14 In a world with positive trans-
action costs, exclusive rights to authors, by necessity, eliminate 
some kinds of uses by nonauthors and future authors.15 At the 
same time, infinite protection is not necessary to incentivize the 
creation of most works, and therefore it is not desirable. Indeed, 
the more protection granted to authors, the more likely it is that 
society is overpaying. Hence, the optimal incentive structure in-
volves giving only some rights and powers to authors—just 
enough to motivate the creation of original works—while reserv-
ing the remaining rights and powers to the public.16 We contend 
that fair use is one of the key means by which this division should 
be effected. Fair use helps filter protections to ensure efficient allo-
cation of uses to societally favored users while still fully maintain-
ing the incentive effects of copyright protection for authors. 
A second important predicate of our theory is the insight that, 
absent the need to incentivize production of expressive works, it 
would be best to allow the public full and unfettered use of all 
 
 14 Oren Bracha and Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Paradigm? Product Dif-
ferentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 Tex L Rev 1841, 1884–85 (2014); Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 Harv L Rev 1569, 1589–91 (2009). 
 15 See Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1613 (cited in note 5). 
 16 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 341–44 (1989). 
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expressions, irrespective of their origin. This is due to the fact 
that expressive works are nonrivalrous in their consumption.17 
That is to say, the use of an expressive work by any particular 
consumer does not diminish in any way the ability of another user 
to consume it. A million people can read William Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet, and the words will remain undiminished for the millionth-
and-first reader. 
Given this state of affairs, the optimal fair use doctrine would 
limit rights strictly to those necessary to incentivize creation, 
while leaving the public to consume copyrighted works without 
restriction beyond that minimum. Ordinarily, we think of this 
balance as being struck by giving authors time-limited exclusive 
rights and giving the public unlimited use of the works once those 
rights have expired. But, as we show, there is actually a better 
way to reach the balance. The law can grant rights to authors that 
are prima facie larger than necessary to incentivize, while at the 
same time cutting away from those rights by allocating extensive 
use privileges to the public. Allocating use privileges directly to 
users can produce significant societal benefits, especially when 
the privileges focus on uses that produce significant follow-on 
benefits to other members of the public. Such an allocation not 
only ensures the exercise of use privileges by those who find them 
valuable, saving the cost of transferring those rights from owner 
to user, but it also ensures the benefits of uses that create positive 
externalities for the nonconsuming public. Allocating the uses di-
rectly to users also reduces ancillary costs, such as search costs 
that are saved by users’ self-selection. 
Accordingly, we posit that the fair use doctrine should be pri-
marily concerned with preserving public privileges in uses that 
themselves produce the most widely spread benefits to the public. 
Specifically, the fair use doctrine should enable consumers to uti-
lize expressive works without the consent of the author when the 
uses create widespread follow-on benefits throughout society. 
The key to creating a viable dual-grant strategy of copyright, 
of course, is producing a workable dividing line between privi-
leged uses and protected rights. In considering the allocation of 
authors’ rights and public privileges, it must be borne in mind 
that not all uses of expressive works are created equal. Some uses 
of expressive works bring about broad-based benefits to society. 
For instance, as scholarship and discussion about the First 
 
 17 Lunney, 82 BU L Rev at 994–95 (cited in note 11). 
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Amendment observes, the Constitution expects the state to be 
particularly solicitous of political speech.18 Likewise, the Copy-
right Clause19 reveals a societal interest in encouraging science 
and the pursuit of knowledge. Stated otherwise, the state seeks to 
promote the pursuit of truth20 as a valuable goal in and of itself.21 
Other categories, such as education (“teaching,” in the terminology 
of the Copyright Act), are found directly in § 107 of the Act.22 
Accordingly, uses of highly dispersed social value should be 
considered presumptively public under the auspices of the fair use 
doctrine, and only in extreme cases should the public be deprived 
of them. By contrast, other types of uses—first and foremost, 
standard commercial uses—should be considered to be within the 
scope of the rights granted exclusively to authors. In other words, 
in the case of standard commercial uses, the reverse legal pre-
sumption should obtain—that is, unauthorized uses are typically 
not fair, unless there are special circumstances that justify deny-
ing exclusivity to authors, such as market failure. Here, the value 
to the public of the uses is likely to be directly translated into 
benefits to authors, and the standard copyright protections 
should obtain. 
Our reconceptualization of fair use has a significant doctrinal 
payoff. Most importantly, our fair use conception requires courts 
applying fair use to be sensitive to the degree of copyright protec-
tion offered more generally. An expansion of rights granted to au-
thors, such as the extension of copyright protection for an addi-
tional twenty years,23 should be matched by an expansion of fair 
 
 18 See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into 
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan L Rev 299, 304–22 (1978) (analyzing a 
variety of sources to conclude that the First Amendment, at a minimum, “protects the 
process of forming and expressing the will of the majority according to which our repre-
sentatives must govern”). 
 19 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. We refer to this clause as the “Copyright Clause,” as we 
are interested in only its reference to copyright law. The Clause refers to patent law as 
well, and it might more accurately be labeled the “Intellectual Property Clause.” 
 20 See Hustler Magazine, Inc v Falwell, 485 US 46, 52 (1988) (stressing the signifi-
cance of the “truth-seeking function” of the First Amendment); Patrick Garry, The First 
Amendment and Freedom of the Press: A Revised Approach to the Marketplace of Ideas 
Concept, 72 Marq L Rev 187, 197 (1989); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A 
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1, 6–8. 
 21 In this Article, we take these constitutional values as givens. 
 22 17 USC § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including . . . for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching[,] . . . scholarship, or research, is not 
an infringement of copyright.”). 
 23 Such an extension was implemented by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act, Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827 (1998), codified as amended at 17 USC §§ 108, 203, 
301–04. 
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use privileges in order to once again balance the competing im-
pulses of copyright law. 
To implement our proposed conception of fair use, we propose 
a new doctrinal mechanism for identifying and upholding fair 
uses. Under our conceptualization of fair use, whenever the intent 
behind any use of an expressive work is for one of the aims of fair 
use, the use should be considered prima facie “fair” and permitted. 
Our definition of inherently public uses encompasses several of the 
presumptively fair uses in the preamble of § 107 of the Copyright 
Act, such as research and news reporting.24 To us, political speech, 
the pursuit of factual accuracy, and scientific advancement 
should be put on equal footing with, if not above, the illustrative 
uses in § 107. Within the ambit of truth seeking, we would also 
grant privileged status to new technological projects aimed at the 
enhancement and spread of knowledge, such as Google Books,25 
even though they are not listed in the preamble of § 107. 
At the same time, we maintain that some of the uses des-
cribed as favored in fair use jurisprudence, such as parodic uses, 
need not be considered presumptively “fair.” More generally, we 
suggest as a rule of thumb that any categories of uses that create 
significant nonpecuniary benefits to follow-on users (that is, sub-
sequent consumers of the expression that will be utilizing the use 
that is now claimed to be “fair”) should be considered fair uses. 
The dual-grant theory of fair use that we advocate brings 
some needed coherence to the doctrine of fair use. It provides a 
better account of some of the key themes in recent case law, while 
at the same time suggesting that different results should have 
been reached in several of the cases. More importantly, we show 
how our approach can reduce some of the ambiguity surrounding 
fair use decisions, and we lend greater clarity to the statutory 
framework. 
Our Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we explore cur-
rent understandings of fair use and, in particular, the dominant 
market-failure theory. In Part II, we present our contribution to 
fair use theory by offering an alternative understanding of the 
fair use doctrine, focusing, in particular, on how fair use is an ef-
ficient allocation of use privileges to the public at large. In 
Part III, we present our contribution to fair use doctrine by pro-
posing alterations that implement our understanding of the role 
 
 24 17 USC § 107. 
 25 See Part III.C.2.b. 
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of fair use. Finally, in Part IV, we explore the interface between 
our theory of fair use and other writings on copyright, property, 
and free speech. 
I.  CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF FAIR USE 
A. The Market-Failure Understanding of Fair Use 
The predominant theoretical justification of the fair use doc-
trine stems from an article by Professor Gordon over three dec-
ades ago.26 In an article that has become a classic among intellec-
tual property scholars,27 Gordon tied fair use to the economic 
notion of market failure resulting from high transaction costs.28 
To understand Gordon’s important insight, it is necessary to take 
a step back and begin with the animating philosophy that under-
lies the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. Article I, § 8 of the 
Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”29 As many scholars have pointed out, the constitu-
tional language suggests that the Framers viewed intellectual 
property protection as a means to an end, namely, to encourage 
the production of inventions and works of authorship.30 
The grant of exclusive rights in intellectual goods in the form 
of copyright (and patent) protection has a double effect, both neg-
ative and positive. The negative effect of conferring protection is 
to take away certain rights from the public. If a work is protected 
by the law of copyright, the public may no longer copy, adapt, or 
otherwise use the work at will. At the same time, the grant has 
the positive effect of depositing all these rights in the control of 
the authors. Together, these two effects direct those users who 
wish to use copyrighted works to transact with authors and pay 
authors for the privilege of using their works of authorship. Im-
portantly, it is the latter effect—authors’ ownership of rights—
 
 26 See generally Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev 1600 (cited in note 5). 
 27 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use beyond 
Market Failure, 18 Berkeley Tech L J 539, 542 (2003); Christina Bohannan, Copyright 
Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 Wash U L Rev 969, 972 n 15 (2007). 
 28 See generally Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev 1600 (cited in note 5). 
 29 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
 30 Balganesh, 122 Harv L Rev at 1576–77 & n 16 (cited in note 14). See also Landes 
and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 326 (cited in note 16) (emphasizing that one of copyright 
law’s central goals is to maintain incentives for individuals to produce creative works). 
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that induces users to pay authors through voluntary market 
transactions and that thereby incentivizes authors to keep creating. 
It is imperative to understand, however, that the grant of ex-
clusivity via copyright protection does not by itself guarantee pe-
cuniary rewards to authors. Indeed, most authors discover that 
even though their works receive extensive copyright protection, 
no commercial success is forthcoming.31 On its own, legal exclu-
sivity gives little to authors. It is merely a background condition 
necessary for the formation of markets. The actual remuneration 
of authors is decided by two parameters that are partly exogenous 
to the law. The first is the utility enjoyed by users. The second is 
transaction costs. 
As Professor Ronald Coase stressed in his seminal article The 
Problem of Social Cost, it is only in the imaginary world without 
transaction costs that we can be certain that voluntary market 
transactions will inexorably lead to the efficient allocation of re-
sources.32 In the real world, transaction costs are an ever-present 
influence on economic activity. These costs include expenditures 
on identifying the relevant counterparty, negotiating with it, for-
mulating legal agreements, and, on some views, incurring en-
forcement costs.33 If transaction costs are too high relative to the 
gains of transacting, no voluntary transactions will take place—
and as a consequence, legal entitlements will not gravitate to 
higher-value users through market transactions.34 As an illustra-
tion, consider the following example. Assume that Abbie, a PhD 
student, wishes to quote a short paragraph from a foreign book in 
her dissertation. Assume further that Abbie is willing to pay $12 
for the right to quote from the book. Assume as well that the au-
thor’s asking price is $10. Although at first blush it may appear 
that the conditions will support a voluntary transaction, a closer 
look demonstrates the need for caution. Once we incorporate even 
modest transaction costs in the amount of $5 to the calculus, we 
can see that the transaction will not occur. Abbie will not agree to 
 
 31 See Nigel Parker, Music Business: Infrastructure, Practice and Law 272 (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2004); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection 
of Works of Information, 90 Colum L Rev 1865, 1869 (1990) (“Moreover, to the extent that 
the worth of the work lies in the information, rather than in the form[,] . . . modern copy-
right’s emphasis on personality-manifesting characteristics fails to secure the commercial 
value of these kinds of endeavors, even though the demand for productions such as direc-
tories . . . is ever increasing.”). 
 32 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15 (1960). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id at 15–16. 
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pay $15 ($10 in price plus $5 in transaction costs) to obtain a use 
permit that is worth only $12 to her. Doing so would represent a 
net loss of $3 to Abbie. In a world without fair use, therefore, Abbie 
will abstain from using the paragraph and forgo a potential gain 
of $2. 
Building on this insight, Gordon suggested that fair use may 
be used to benefit users without (unduly) harming authors when 
transaction costs prevent voluntary exchanges from taking 
place.35 Gordon showed that allowing fair use in cases like Abbie’s 
would lead to a superior outcome. Considering Abbie a fair user 
permits her to use the paragraph for free, creating a net societal 
gain. If the author’s asking price actually reflects a cost to the 
author (in the form of dilution of the copyrighted work, for exam-
ple), society is better off by $2 as a result of the fair use. In the 
more likely case, in which the author faces little or no marginal 
cost as a result of Abbie’s use, allowing Abbie the use without per-
mission creates a net societal gain of $12 with all of the gain going 
to Abbie, yet not leaving the author worse off. 
Gordon proposed three cumulative conditions that must be 
present for fair use to be recognized in her market-failure theory. 
First, transaction costs must bar voluntary exchanges between 
copyright owners and users. Second, the use for which fair use 
status is sought must promote the public interest. And third, al-
lowing the contested use to continue under the rubric of fair use 
must not significantly diminish the author’s incentives to produce 
new works.36 
Notwithstanding the elegance and analytical prowess of the 
market-failure theory of fair use, it suffers from several problems. 
First, as one of us has pointed out, the usefulness of the market-
failure theory as a judicial tool is largely undermined by the fact 
that it relies on information that is nonobservable and nonverifi-
able by the courts.37 To use the proposed transaction cost frame-
work to evaluate fair use claims, courts must know the value a 
user ascribes to a certain use—but this datum is private infor-
mation that is known only to the user and may not be easily as-
certained by the court. In litigation, any user who availed herself 
 
 35 Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1626 (cited in note 5) (“When severe market failure is 
present, injury to the copyright owner may not follow from infringement.”). 
 36 Id at 1626–27. 
 37 Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 Legal Theory 
347, 357–61 (1997). 
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of a work without permission could argue that her use was of min-
imal value and that an agreement between the parties would 
therefore not have been feasible in light of the transaction costs. 
Second, and no less significantly, the market-failure theory 
of fair use portrays fair use as an exception to the general rule 
that all use rights should reside with copyright owners. Indeed, 
in later writings, Gordon herself addressed this problem with 
the market-failure theory.38 Elaborating on this point, Professor 
Raymond Ku wrote: “Under [the market-failure] approach, fair use 
is an exception to the otherwise exclusive rights of copyright justified 
by the presence of market barriers such as high transaction costs, 
externalities, non-monetizable benefits, or anti-dissemination mo-
tives.”39 However, as we show in the next Section, fair use is not 
understood by courts as an anomaly or an exception. It is seen as 
central to the structure of copyright law. The market-failure theory 
is thus problematic as a descriptive theory of the law. 
Furthermore, as many commentators have pointed out, the 
actual amount of transaction costs associated with many trans-
fers of rights changes over time.40 An important factor that de-
presses transaction costs is technology. The ascent of the Inter-
net, in particular, makes it possible for copyright holders to 
communicate to the public at large (by means of a website posting, 
for instance) elaborate menus of prices for various uses of their 
expressive goods and thereby to obviate the need for extensive ne-
gotiations concerning the use of intellectual goods.41 This phenom-
enon was noted, for example, by Professor Robert Merges, who 
 
 38 See, for example, Wendy J. Gordon and Daniel Bahls, The Public’s Right to Fair 
Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid the “Fared Use” Fallacy, 2007 Utah L Rev 619, 651–
54 (addressing the “need [for] a comprehensive definition of the public’s rights in the realm 
of expression” in the doctrine of fair use); Gordon, 50 J Copyright Society USA at 151–54 
(cited in note 7) (describing the claim in earlier work that “fair use should generally be 
denied if recognizing the defense would cause substantial injury to the copyright owner” 
as “overbroad”); Gordon, 82 BU L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 7) (asserting that her original 
use of the term “market failure” was overly narrow and should be more expansive). 
 39 Ku, 18 Berkeley Tech L J at 542 (cited in note 27), citing Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev 
at 1627–35 (cited in note 5). 
 40 Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and 
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 281, 295 (2003) (“As trans-
action costs drop through a combination of institutional arrangements such as the Cop-
yright Clearance Center, and as the internet creates a ubiquitous structure for micro-
transactions—microconsents with micropayments—fair use might cease to play a mean-
ingful role.”); Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va L 
Rev 1483, 1499–1500 (2007) (“[T]ransaction costs are not static.”). 
 41 Parchomovsky and Goldman, 93 Va L Rev at 1499–1500 (cited in note 40) (“The 
rise of the Internet and the advent of digital platforms, together with the development of 
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questioned the need for limitations on intellectual property rights 
in an online world without “friction.”42 Taking this point to its log-
ical extreme, Professor Tom Bell argued in a provocative article 
that, in the Internet age, “fair use” should be replaced with “fared 
use,” suggesting that no unauthorized uses of intellectual works 
should be free any more.43 Indeed, any theory of fair use that is 
based solely on market failure due to transaction costs necessarily 
suggests an ever-diminishing fair use doctrine in an age in which 
many kinds of transaction costs continue to decline. Gordon’s own 
discomfort with this conclusion in later writings44 demonstrates 
that she, like others, believes that there is more to fair use than 
simply a strategy for dealing with the market failures created by 
transaction costs. 
It should be noted that technology does not eliminate all rel-
evant transaction costs. In support of Gordon’s theory, Professors 
Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi have pointed out that even 
with declining transaction costs, the fair use doctrine still plays 
an important role under the market-failure theory in situations 
involving transactions with multiple rights holders.45 In such set-
tings, each right holder may strategically hold out and deny an 
aspiring user the power to use her work in the hope of extracting 
the full value of the user’s project. Fair use mitigates this problem 
by setting a cap on the ability of rights holders to withhold con-
sent strategically.46 While Depoorter and Parisi’s point is both ele-
gant and well-taken, it potentially limits the usefulness of the 
market-failure theory to only cases in which a user must clear 
multiple rights and has no other alternatives. 
Finally, as Professor Matthew Sag points out, fair use is highly 
important in the context of promotion of “copy-reliant” technologi-
cal innovations. When analyzing the impact of transaction costs on 
 
copyright clearance agencies, have reduced many of the transaction costs that previously 
stood as barriers to cost-effective bargaining.”) (citation omitted). 
 42 Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “New-
tonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech L J 115, 130, 136 (1997). 
 43 Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Manage-
ment on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 NC L Rev 557, 579–600 (1998). 
 44 Gordon and Bahls, 2007 Utah L Rev at 619–24 (cited in note 38). 
 45 Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price 
Theory Explanation, 21 Intl Rev L & Econ 453, 458–62 (2002). 
 46 Id at 463–64 (“The emergence of a ‘click and pay’ economy . . . does not necessarily 
eliminate the strategic pricing of copyright licenses. Whenever anticommons costs are se-
rious enough to undermine the viability of the transaction, fair-use doctrines become a 
valuable tool for mitigating the resulting deadweight losses.”). 
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such innovations, it is immaterial that the transaction costs asso-
ciated with the making of individual copies are considerably low-
ered because of technological progress. In such instances, we need 
to factor in “the total volume of transaction costs faced by copy-
reliant technologies,” not “the costs attending any one transac-
tion.”47 Moreover, such technologies “typically rely on . . . default 
rules and . . . opt-out mechanisms to reduce transaction costs,”48 
these default rules in turn depending on the fair use doctrine for 
their legal validity or acceptance as industry practice. 
It is noteworthy that Gordon has often pointed out that her 
earlier work was misunderstood.49 In a later article written with 
Daniel Bahls, the authors explained that market failure resulting 
from relatively high transaction costs constitutes a prima facie 
reason to recognize fair use, but they by no means exhausted all 
the cases in which fair use ought to be considered. Rather, fair 
use should also be available in cases of 
patterns of creative production that are not consistent with 
bureaucratic behaviors; anticommons, hold-out and bilateral 
monopoly problems; distributional inequities; positive exter-
nalities; use of another’s work not as expression but as a fact; 
use of another’s expression as a means to access the public 
domain; and critical, nonmonetizable and/or “priceless” uses 
of copyrighted works.50 
Gordon’s expanded framework addresses many of the prob-
lems that inhere in the market-failure model, but it does so at the 
cost of a coherent account that is guided by a single principle. We 
view the clarification she offered in her article with Bahls as an 
invitation to supplement the market-failure theory of fair use 
with a broader theoretical conceptualization that would move the 
discussion in the direction Gordon and Bahls pointed out. It is 
precisely this call that we answer in the next Part. 
 
 47 Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 Nw U L Rev 1607, 
1664 (2009). 
 48 Id at 1666. 
 49 See Gordon, 50 J Copyright Society USA at 150 (cited in note 7) (asserting that 
her “1982 article has been often misapplied, by both courts and commentators”); Gordon 
and Bahls, 2007 Utah L Rev at 623–24 (cited in note 38) (clarifying that her original 
market-failure theory “never purported to displace the other justifications for fair use,” 
but has been used by commentators to suggest that transaction costs are “the sole basis 
for fair use”). 
 50 Gordon and Bahls, 2007 Utah L Rev at 635 (cited in note 38). 
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B. Recent Trends in Fair Use Case Law 
One of the many strengths of Gordon’s article when it was 
published was the fit between the market-failure theory and the 
case law as it existed at the time. While judges did not expressly 
refer to market failure in fair use decisions, Gordon’s theory had 
strong explanatory power. The case that Gordon used as the pri-
mary illustration of her theory was Universal City Studios, Inc v 
Sony Corp of America.51 The legal issue was whether Sony, the 
manufacturer and distributor of Betamax, the first videocassette 
recorder (VCR), was secondarily liable for copyright infringement 
by VCR consumers. In particular, the question was whether Sony 
should be held to have contributed to the unauthorized recording 
of copyrighted television programs by home users of its technol-
ogy.52 Gordon wrote in opposition to the decision of the Ninth Cir-
cuit to hold Sony liable for its contribution to consumer infringe-
ments.53 Gordon argued that Sony should not be found liable 
because the home uses of the VCR should be seen as fair uses due 
to market failure.54 
Following the publication of Gordon’s article, the Supreme 
Court in Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc55 re-
versed the Ninth Circuit’s holding, declaring that Sony did not sec-
ondarily infringe. In holding for Sony, the Supreme Court ruled, 
inter alia, that the practice of recording programs for later view-
ing—a practice it labeled “time shifting”—was fair use.56 The Sup-
reme Court’s decision vindicated Gordon’s framework of analysis. 
After all, it is unrealistic to expect technology providers, such as 
Sony, to secure permission prior to putting their technology on the 
market from the thousands upon thousands of owners of rights in 
the numerous copyrighted television works. The large number of 
rights holders involved makes reliance on voluntary transactions 
impractical. Not only would the large number of rights holders re-
quire Sony to expend considerable resources on identifying the rel-
evant counterparties and carrying out negotiations with them, but 
 
 51 659 F2d 963 (9th Cir 1981). Gordon’s article was written in the interim between 
this decision and Sony Corp of America v Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 US 417 (1984). 
The article focused, naturally, on the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 
 52 Sony, 464 US at 420. 
 53 See Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1652–57 (cited in note 5). 
 54 See id at 1655–57. 
 55 464 US 417 (1984). 
 56 Id at 455–56. 
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it would also mean that each of the counterparties could strategi-
cally hold Sony up by refusing to tender permission in the hope of 
extracting an especially high payment from Sony. 
Sony, it turned out, was the high-water mark for the market-
failure theory. Recent years have seen the case law moving away 
from the market-failure theory. First, in Campbell v Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc,57 the Supreme Court had to decide whether an unau-
thorized rap version of the song “Oh, Pretty Woman” came under 
the auspices of fair use.58 In a pathbreaking decision, the Court 
ruled that it did, explaining that the rap version may be reasona-
bly perceived as a parody of the original.59 As importantly, in a 
sharp deviation from prior decisions, the Court elevated trans-
formativeness above all other fair use factors.60 Following 
Campbell, recent fair use decisions appear to focus on the trans-
formativeness of the defendants’ works, not transaction costs, 
as the key factor in fair use cases.61 This trend is especially strong 
in the Second Circuit and can be seen in that court’s decisions in 
Blanch v Koons62 and Cariou v Prince.63 In Blanch, the Second 
Circuit was required to decide whether the defendant’s painting, 
which incorporated the plaintiff’s photograph without her permis-
sion, qualified as fair use.64 The court ruled that it was fair use, 
even though the defendant’s work was commercial and did not 
 
 57 510 US 569 (1994). 
 58 Id at 571–72. 
 59 Id at 581–83. 
 60 Id at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be the signifi-
cance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). 
 61 See Kathleen K. Olson, The Future of Fair Use, 19 Communication L & Pol 417, 
420–21 (2014) (highlighting the importance of transformativeness in court decisions post-
Campbell); Sag, 73 Ohio St L J at 76–77 (cited in note 8) (concluding, based on empirical 
studies of court decisions, that although transformativeness is “not the ‘alpha and omega’” 
of fair use, it is nevertheless a significant core component of fair use); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 Lewis & Clark L Rev 715, 736 (2011) (finding that, 
after 2005, courts’ use of the fair use doctrine is “overwhelmingly dominated” by trans-
formativeness); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free 
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L J 535, 550–51 (2004) (tracing the rising 
importance of transformativeness in fair use back to 1990); Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding 
Fair Use: The “Transformative” Use Doctrine after Campbell, 7 Communication L & Pol 1, 
2 (2002) (analyzing the history of transformativeness and arguing that courts’ increasing 
reliance on it overprotects copyright holders). Transformativeness may sometimes overlap 
with high transaction costs, but as a practical and analytical matter, there is no necessary 
correlation between the two benchmarks. 
 62 467 F3d 244 (2d Cir 2006). 
 63 714 F3d 694 (2d Cir 2013). 
 64 Blanch, 467 F3d at 246. 
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parody the plaintiff’s work.65 In this case, there were only two par-
ties involved and no market failure seemed to have been present. 
The court, however, did not focus on these factors. Rather, it con-
cluded that in its opinion “copyright law’s goal of ‘promoting the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts’ . . . would be better served by 
allowing Koons’s use of ‘Silk Sandals’ than by preventing it.”66 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Cariou was even more ex-
treme. In that case, the defendant, Richard Prince, was an “ap-
propriation artist” who lifted many of the plaintiff’s photographs 
of the Rastafarian people of Jamaica and transformed them into 
his own artistic style by, “among other things, painting ‘lozenges’ 
over their subjects’ facial features and using only portions of some 
of the images.”67 Prince did not even attempt to negotiate a license 
from Patrick Cariou before using the images.68 Worse yet, Prince 
did not bother to offer a justification for his actions. When asked 
whether he intended his adaptations to be transformative, he an-
swered that “he ‘[didn’t] really have a message’” and that “he was 
not ‘trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new mes-
sage.’”69 Nonetheless, the court explained that 
[w]hat is critical is how the work in question appears to the 
reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say 
about a particular piece or body of work. Prince’s work could 
be transformative even without commenting on Cariou’s 
work or on culture, and even without Prince’s stated inten-
tion to do so.70 
The court proceeded to find fair use with respect to twenty-
five of Prince’s works that used Cariou’s images.71 From a pure 
market-failure perspective, there was little reason to find fair use. 
The defendant in this case simply bypassed the market, notwith-
standing the fact that the transaction costs in this case seemed 
very low relative to the value of the uses. Indeed, with respect to 
the five images whose use was not ruled fair by the Second Cir-
cuit, the parties settled.72 
 
 65 Id at 254–55. 
 66 Id at 259, quoting US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
 67 Cariou, 714 F3d at 699. 
 68 See id. 
 69 Id at 707. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Cariou, 714 F3d at 712. 
 72 Brian Boucher, Landmark Copyright Lawsuit Cariou v. Prince Is Settled (Art in 
America, Mar 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/B8LX-5K8Q. 
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No less importantly, in two recent decisions, Eldred v Ashcroft73 
and Golan v Holder,74 the Supreme Court conceptualized fair use 
not as an anomaly or an exception, but as an intrinsic and indis-
pensable part of the design of the constitutional copyright system. 
Eldred involved a facial challenge to the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act,75 in which Congress extended the term of 
protection by twenty additional years.76 The legislation offered the 
extension not only prospectively to works that were yet to be cre-
ated, but also retroactively to works that had already come into 
existence under the previous, shorter protection term.77 A group 
of publishers whose business model was predicated on public do-
main materials argued that the extension was unconstitutional 
because it exceeded Congress’s power under both the Copyright 
Clause and the First Amendment.78 The Court ultimately rejected 
the challenge and approved the extension, explaining that the ex-
tension came under the aegis of the Copyright Clause and that it 
did not violate the First Amendment.79 In this vein, the Court 
stated that “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment ac-
commodations.”80 Among those accommodations, the Court listed 
the idea-expression dichotomy, under which copyright protection 
extends to original expression but is withheld from the ideas un-
derlying it, as well as the fair use doctrine, which “affords consid-
erable ‘latitude for scholarship and comment.’”81 
The Court’s language in Golan is even more instructive. In 
Golan, the lead petitioner, a conductor and music professor, chal-
lenged the United States’ implementation of § 514 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement Act, now found in § 104A of the Copyright 
Act.82 Section 104A reinstates copyright protection for multiple 
foreign works that had fallen into the public domain for failing to 
comply with various formalities.83 Lawrence Golan argued that 
the legislation violated his free speech rights by impoverishing 
 
 73 537 US 186 (2003). 
 74 132 S Ct 873 (2012). 
 75 Pub L No 105-298, 112 Stat 2827 (1998), codified as amended at 17 USC §§ 108, 
203, 301–04. 
 76 Eldred, 537 US at 193. 
 77 Id at 195–96. 
 78 Id at 193. 
 79 Id at 221–22. 
 80 Eldred, 537 US at 219, citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 
471 US 539, 560 (1985). 
 81 Eldred, 537 US at 219–20, quoting Harper & Row, 471 US at 560. 
 82 Golan, 132 S Ct at 878. 
 83 17 USC § 104A(a)(1), (h)(6). 
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the public domain.84 Once again, the Supreme Court dismissed 
the challenge. Reiterating the reasoning in Eldred, the Court 
stated that the “traditional contours” of the copyright system are 
delineated by the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use.85 The 
Court proceeded to explain that legislative changes limiting the 
availability of copyrighted works to the public will pass judicial 
muster as long as they do not affect the idea-expression dichotomy 
or curtail fair use.86 As Professor Neil Netanel has pointed out, 
one clear implication of the Supreme Court’s ruling is that the 
First Amendment forbids legislation that would significantly re-
strict fair use.87 
II.  A NEW THEORY OF FAIR USE 
In this Part, we present our alternative approach to the fair 
use doctrine. We argue that our approach better fits both the eco-
nomic imperatives of copyright law and the recent case law on the 
subject. 
Perhaps the easiest way to understand our approach is by 
contrasting it to the market-failure approach. In some ways, ours 
is the polar opposite of the market-failure approach. The market-
failure theory assumes that all rights associated with copyrighted 
works should be presumed to lie with the owner of the copyright. 
In this view, fair use is an exception that allows transfers of those 
rights to users on a transaction-by-transaction basis, and only 
when a particular transaction is likely to be blocked by market 
failure.88 
Our theory, by contrast, assumes that copyright law cons-
ciously allocates to users many privileged uses, irrespective of the 
desires of the author. The law divides the rights associated with 
copyrighted works between author and public. We assume that 
certain privileges associated with copyrighted works should be 
presumed to lie with the general public and that those privileges 
should be denied only in extreme cases. As we show, our proposed 
version of the doctrine would have courts recognize a contested 
use as “fair” whenever two conditions are met: First, the use is 
 
 84 Golan, 132 S Ct at 891. 
 85 Id at 890. 
 86 See id at 890–91. 
 87 Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright after Golan 
v. Holder, 60 UCLA L Rev 1082, 1128 (2013). 
 88 See Part I.A. 
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within the scope of several presumptively public uses, such as po-
litical speech or research. These presumptively public uses can be 
identified by category and are characterized by the creation of sig-
nificant value for follow-on users. Second, granting the use the 
status of “fair use”—or, more precisely, granting the status of fair 
use to the class of uses that would be encompassed both by the 
user’s proposed fair use and by similar uses by similarly situated 
users—would not entirely eliminate the incentive to create this 
particular work. The second condition largely overlaps with one 
of the elements of Professor Gordon’s proposal,89 with some differ-
ences that we highlight below.90 We acknowledge that it also 
shares one of the imperfections of the similar element in Gordon’s 
account, namely, that the determination will not be mathemati-
cal—though, as we show,91 it should produce clearer results than 
Gordon’s proposal. In particular, we show that our approach has 
the advantage of focusing on the character of the use rather than 
the character of the user. Thus, we are able to avoid individual-
ized assessments of users in every fair use case. 
At the outset, however, we must state that while our analysis 
differs in significant respects from Gordon’s original market-
failure theory, doctrinally our proposal should be seen as a cu-
mulative addition to market-failure analysis, rather than a repu-
diation of it. While our theory of fair use leads us to embrace a 
new doctrine for protecting uses that would not be protected un-
der the market-failure theory, our theory is not incompatible with 
the idea that uses that would be subject to market failure due to 
relatively high transaction costs should be treated as fair uses in 
addition to the other uses that we identify as presumptively fair 
uses. Likewise, we emphasize that our goal in using the market-
failure theory as a backdrop against which we portray our theory 
is not to discredit Gordon’s many invaluable contributions to the 
theory of fair use. On the contrary, it is due to the significance of 
her illuminating and multifaceted scholarship in this area that 
her theories provide the starting point for our discussion.92 
 
 89 Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1618–19 (cited in note 5). Gordon terms this the “sub-
stantial injury hurdle” required to be overcome in cases of “intermediate market failure.” Id. 
 90 See Part III.C.1. 
 91 See Part III.C.2. 
 92 Indeed, in one important sense, our proposal is very close to Gordon’s. Specifically, 
as we show, our proposal, like Gordon’s, is—at least in some cases—focused on transaction 
costs. However, our treatment of the transaction cost issue is very different from Gordon’s. 
In our view, one of the central concerns of the fair use doctrine is granting users the rights 
to carry out uses that would otherwise be attended by high transaction costs. However, 
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A. The Economics of Copyright 
The point of departure for our theory of fair use is an incentives-
based or economic understanding of copyright. There is little doubt 
that the foundations of American copyright law, as found in the 
Constitution, are economically based and aimed at incentivizing 
authorship.93 The Copyright Clause tells us that Congress should 
grant exclusive rights in “Writings” to “Authors” in order to “pro-
mote the Progress of Science.”94 Copyright law aims to incentivize 
the creation of expressive works by granting authors exclusive 
rights in their creations—enough rights to make creation pecuni-
arily worthwhile for authors while not unduly removing expres-
sions from the public domain.95 
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner’s classic 
article on the economics of copyright law explains the incentive 
structure created by copyright law.96 There are two outstanding 
features of expressions that must be taken into account by law-
makers in establishing the law of copyright. First, expressions, 
like other items that are encompassed within the world of intel-
lectual property, have features of what the economic literature 
calls “public goods.”97 This means that the market alone will not 
 
the reason for this is not that we are concerned that the high transaction costs might block 
otherwise-valuable transactions. Rather, we worry that the transaction costs themselves 
are costs to society that can sometimes be avoided. Simply put, when the fair use doctrine 
allocates a use to a user who can derive benefit from the expression, the doctrine saves the 
user and the author the cost of negotiating a license and thereby benefits society. Viewed 
in this way, transaction costs are potentially enough to justify fair use any time they are 
above zero (or at least above the cost of administering the doctrine of fair use), even if they 
are not so high as to bar voluntary transactions. 
 93 See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, 
and Law, 76 NYU L Rev 23, 59–60 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has held consistently and 
unanimously that American law explicitly treats intellectual property rights in utilitarian 
terms.”); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foun-
dations of the Public Domain, 66 L & Contemp Probs 173, 175–77 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 94 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
 95 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand L Rev 1799, 1801 (2000) 
(“Copyright law conceives and promotes progress in two distinct but related ways: First, 
it seeks to increase both the quantity and quality of creative output. Second, it seeks to 
broaden public access to creative works.”); S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, 
and Price Discrimination, 8 Rsrch L & Econ 181, 184–86 (1986); Ian E. Novos and Michael 
Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach, 92 J Polit 
Econ 236, 244 (1984). 
 96 See generally Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud 325 (cited in note 16). 
 97 Depoorter and Parisi, 21 Intl Rev L & Econ at 454 n 4 (cited in note 45); Mark A. 
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex L Rev 989, 
994–96 (1997); Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 326 (cited in note 16); William W. 
Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv L Rev 1659, 1700–05 (1988); 
Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 1610–11 (cited in note 5); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case 
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produce the goods and that some legal incentives are necessary to 
prompt the market to produce them. Second, the legal incentives 
created by copyright law are themselves potentially market dis-
torting.98 Like all intellectual property law, copyright law can cre-
ate monopolies or other anticompetitive features.99 Copyright law 
thus eternally seeks to balance the beneficial and harmful aspects 
of the rights that it grants to authors.100 Unfortunately, the very 
same tools used by lawmakers to create and encourage copyright 
markets are the ones that distort those markets. 
There is a vast literature on public goods and the reasons why 
ordinary markets will not produce them. Public goods are items 
whose consumption is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable—that is, 
all users can use the items without diminishing the ability of oth-
ers to consume them, and there is no way to block potential users 
from consuming the items.101 Pure public goods cannot be sold in 
the market effectively and therefore cannot bring returns to their 
producers. Consequently, there is no reason a private producer 
will ever decide to manufacture public goods.102 Expressions, or 
more generally information, are in many ways the quintessential 
 
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 
Harv L Rev 281, 281 n 4 (1970). 
 98 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in Cyberspace—Rights without Laws?, 73 Chi 
Kent L Rev 1155, 1171 (1998); Sterk, 94 Mich L Rev at 1204–05 (cited in note 12). See also 
Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 NYU L Rev 212, 227–28 
(2004); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 Cardozo L Rev 121, 133–34 (1999); 
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 
51 Vand L Rev 217, 248–49 (1998); Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 350–51 (cited 
in note 16). 
 99 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex L 
Rev 1031, 1058–59 (2005); Burk, 21 Cardozo L Rev at 133 (cited in note 98); Elkin-Koren, 
73 Chi Kent L Rev at 1171 (cited in note 98); Sterk, 94 Mich L Rev at 1205 (cited in note 12). 
 100 Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Con-
sistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan L Rev 1343, 1344 (1989). See also 
Netanel, 51 Vand L Rev at 248–49 (cited in note 98) (“The incentive rationale posits, how-
ever, that such a ‘tax on readers’ is a necessary evil because, without it, audiences would 
have little creative expression to choose from in the first place.”). 
 101 David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods, 9 
Nw J Tech & Intel Prop 533, 537–38 (2011); R.A. Musgrave, Provision for Social Goods, in 
J. Margolis and H. Guitton, eds, Public Economics: An Analysis of Public Production and 
Consumption and Their Relations to the Private Sectors 124, 126–29 (Macmillan 1969). 
See also Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Re-
lation, 155 U Pa L Rev 635, 644–46 (2007). 
 102 See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the 
Provision of Public Goods, 108 Yale L J 377, 380–90 (1998) (discussing multiple theories 
explaining why private markets underproduce public goods). 
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public goods.103 Information can be consumed by any number of 
people, and the knowledge of one does not in any way diminish 
the knowledge of another. In the ordinary course of events, once 
information is revealed, producers have no practical ability to 
block further transmission of the information to others. While 
there are various nonpecuniary benefits that a producer may get 
from creating expressions or information, the absence of markets 
would mean that in a world without intellectual property rights, 
fewer expressions would be created because there would be fewer 
incentives to create such expressions. 
Copyright law supplies the missing incentives by giving cre-
ators a package of exclusive legal rights in expressions for an ex-
tended period of time. The legal protection makes the expressions 
excludable. That is, once copyright law exists, the producer can 
police the use of the expressions and prevent nonpaying users 
from consuming the good.104 Legal protection thus significantly 
expands the possibilities for markets in expressions and thereby 
incentivizes creativity. 
However, the market created by the legal protection is itself 
a distorted market. During the period of exclusive protection, the 
copyright owner enjoys monopoly rights over the expression.105 
Because expressions often do not have perfect substitutes, the 
market for expressions may often display the characteristic flaws 
of monopolistic markets—excessively high prices and subcompet-
itive supply of the good.106 Legal protections for copyright, in other 
words, impose a cost on society at the same time as they produce 
the societal benefit of incentivizing creation. As a result, noted 
Landes and Posner, while some copyright protection is beneficial 
for society, “beyond some level copyright protection may actually 
be counterproductive.”107 Indeed, since all copyrighted expres-
sions invariably rely to some degree on earlier works, excessive 
copyright protection can directly restrict the cost and availability 
 
 103 See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information without Intellectual Property, 91 
Tex L Rev 227, 235–36 (2012); Peter S. Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Prop-
erty Law, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds, 2 Handbook of Law and Econ-
omics 1473, 1476–79 (Elsevier 2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifica-
tions for Intellectual Property, 71 U Chi L Rev 129, 129 (2004); Gordon, 82 Colum L Rev at 
1610–11 (cited in note 5). 
 104 17 USC § 106. 
 105 See 17 USC § 106. 
 106 See Lemley, 83 Tex L Rev at 1058–60 (cited in note 99). 
 107 Landes and Posner, 18 J Legal Stud at 332 (cited in note 16). 
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of future copyrighted works.108 Copyright law must therefore al-
ways seek to find the balance that maximizes the societal benefit 
of incentivizing creation net the cost of restricting the availability 
of protected expressions. Here, Landes and Posner, like the schol-
ars that have followed them, frankly acknowledge that they have 
no formula for determining the precise amount and type of pro-
tection that would be optimal.109 
B. The Allocation of Rights 
The exclusive rights granted to an author are significant and 
designed to give the author ample opportunity for pecuniary ben-
efit. In general, copyright law specifies that, for a fixed period of 
time,110 only the author is permitted to copy, adapt, display, per-
form, or distribute a copyrighted work.111 This means that during 
this period, most potential users (other than those enjoying the 
benefit of a legal exemption or license)112 must receive permission 
from the author. The author is expected to sell such permission 
and thereby realize the pecuniary rewards of creation. 
As we have written elsewhere, it is highly doubtful that the 
entire package of exclusive rights is necessary to incentivize the 
amount of creation of expressive works we see today.113 For most 
copyrighted works, the authors are inframarginal; they would 
have created the works even if they had been granted only a much 
smaller selection of rights. More broadly, the vast expansion of 
authors’ rights in recent decades has led to widespread criticism 
that compensation of all authors is excessive.114 
How can lawmakers trim the package of authors’ rights to 
give only enough rights to incentivize creation? There are many 
ways to adjust the optimal balance of copyright rights so as to 
attempt to maximize social benefits. The most straightforward—
 
 108 Id. 
 109 See id at 361 (“Whether the law has struck the right balance is not readily 
determinable.”). 
 110 17 USC § 302. 
 111 17 USC § 106. 
 112 See, for example, 17 USC § 110. 
 113 See Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 
113 Mich L Rev 231, 276–77 (2014) (asserting that a voluntarily tailored copyright regime 
would “preserv[e] the incentives to produce intangible assets while reducing the cost to 
society”). See also Bracha and Syed, 92 Tex L Rev at 1858–59 (cited in note 14) (explaining 
how increased copyright protection can block access to some works that would have been 
created even without the additional incentive). 
 114 See Bell and Parchomovsky, 113 Mich L Rev at 241–42 (cited in note 113). 
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but far from the best—means of adjusting is to change the tem-
poral margins of protective terms or rights. For instance, lawmak-
ers can shorten or lengthen the term of protection for copyrighted 
works from its current seventy years plus the life of the author115 
to fifty or ninety years plus the life of the author. Term adjust-
ments straightforwardly subtract or add a certain quantum of in-
centives (the expected pecuniary benefits to be realized by the au-
thor during that future period of time) at the same time as they 
expand or restrict the public’s ability to use the work by changing 
the point in time when the work will enter the public domain. Yet, 
while it is relatively easy for the state to administer adjustments 
of the term of protection, such term adjustments are blunt instru-
ments. During the legal term of protection, whatever it might be, 
authors enjoy the usual monopoly protection for their expres-
sions, meaning that even if the term adjustments are perfectly 
tailored to provide socially desired incentives for creation, those 
incentives might be provided at a higher social cost than neces-
sary. The law could have achieved the same level of incentives by 
granting fewer rights for a longer period of time. Or it could have 
given the same rights for a longer period of time, but expanded 
the number of privileged uses. 
Our approach to the fair use doctrine reads the Copyright Act 
as aiming to adjust the amount of incentives granted to authors 
by setting aside for the public a number of privileged uses. We 
argue that the fair use doctrine seeks to balance copyright 
through a conscious division of legal entitlements between au-
thors and users. In our theory, instead of dividing the rights along 
the axis of time or by the type of exclusive activity granted to the 
author (reproduction, adaptation, distribution, etc.), the fair use 
doctrine is intended to divide legal protections between author 
and public according to the nature of the intended use. The pur-
pose in allocating entitlements this way is to allocate to the public 
certain privileged uses that are likely to be of significant public 
value, while reserving for authors sufficient valuable rights to 
maintain incentives to create. 
In allocating certain privileges to the nonowner users, fair 
use doctrine consciously departs from the usual practice in prop-
erty law, and it is important to explain why. Specifically, we must 
show why it would not be better to just give the copyright owner 
 
 115 17 USC § 302(a). 
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all the rights and allow her to sell to consumers the uses that they 
want. 
To understand the best way to divide these legal protections, 
it is worth taking a second look at the problem of allocating prop-
erty rights. Consider a world in which lawmakers know the opti-
mal users of all uses of assets, the appetite for such uses is fixed 
and stable over time, and allocation among users is costless. In 
this idealized world, the optimal approach would be to allocate 
directly to each potential user the use right in the assets, even if 
this meant dividing up the use rights for a single asset among 
hundreds of users. The allocation would be free, final, and opti-
mal. High-value users would have all the use rights they needed 
in assets. Society would avoid the costs of providing mechanisms 
for efficient allocation. While subsequent transactions in the asset 
might well be difficult and costly, they would also be unnecessary 
because the high-value user of each use would already own what 
she needs. 
Of course, the imaginary world of perfect initial allocations 
does not exist. Appetites for uses are not fixed and stable, and 
even if they were, information about appetites for uses is not 
freely available. Initial allocations are expensive. It is generally 
impossible for a central planner to identify and measure tastes 
anywhere near as efficiently as a marketplace can. In the real 
world, it is difficult to find the circumstances in which a central 
planner dividing uses among many claimants produces net socie-
tal gain.116 
However, the point made by the example is an important one: 
a good initial allocation is of great social benefit. If the allocation 
is done well, it can increase societal welfare by reducing the need 
to transfer rights, thereby saving transaction costs. Indeed, a 
good initial allocation can be of such high social benefit in some 
cases that it can compensate for subsequent societal losses cre-
ated by legal regimes that make transactions more difficult (and 
by the attendant higher cost of those transactions that must take 
place). 
This observation is doubly true when it comes to copyright. 
Because copyright uses are generally nonrivalrous—that is, the 
use of the work by one consumer does not in any way diminish 
 
 116 See Israel M. Kirzner, Economic Planning and the Knowledge Problem, 4 Cato J 
407, 412–14 (1984); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The 
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U Pa L Rev 1643, 1644–
46 (1996). 
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the ability of a different consumer to use it—the cost of misallo-
cation is low. Granting a use right to the wrong consumer does 
not require a new (and costly) transaction; it simply eats away 
from the incentives of the author. Misallocation is not costless. 
But it is not nearly as costly as with ordinary property. 
Our understanding of the fair use doctrine in copyright law 
is informed in large part by the allocative question in light of the 
need for limited rights. The optimal grant of copyright rights 
would not give the owner all rights to the copyrighted work in 
perpetuity. Rather, the optimal grant would give the owner exclu-
sive authority over the work as necessary to incentivize creation. 
At the same time, the fair use doctrine necessarily bestows on 
consumers of the expression exclusively uses of positive value. 
Compare the fair use doctrine, for example, to a rule that curbs 
owners’ terms of protection by ten years. The term limitation 
grants additional privileges to the public, but there may be no au-
dience for such privileges. It may be that there is no market for 
using a given work in its 115th year of protection or, for that mat-
ter, even in its 15th year. Indeed, the value of most expressive 
works disappears long before the protection term runs out.117 The 
fair use doctrine, under any interpretation, applies only to uses 
that at least one consumer desires. If there is no actual use, there 
can be no fair use. A fair use doctrine allocates directly to users 
privileges that they want and value. 
In this sense, there is no better way to achieve division of le-
gal protections between the public and the copyright owner than 
by granting use privileges via such doctrines as fair use. Such doc-
trines necessarily grant to the public something valuable and only 
something valuable. This point deserves emphasis. In general, 
the main societal loss stemming from misallocation of an asset is 
underuse of the asset. If the state allocates an asset to a low-value 
user and transaction costs are excessive, the asset will likely not 
be used by some or all high-value users. In other words, some 
high-value uses will never take place. But this cost of misalloca-
tion does not appear when the state grants use privileges and uses 
are nonrivalrous. In such cases, users will, by necessity, exercise 
their use privileges only when the value of the use is positive for 
them and for society as a whole. Even misallocated use privileges 
will not lead to underuse. By contrast, allocating legal protection 
 
 117 Eldred, 537 US at 248 (Breyer dissenting). 
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directly to the user is valuable to society, because it saves the 
need to transact and the cost that comes with it. 
Unfortunately, use allocations are not flawless, even in the 
world of copyright. There are two chief pitfalls that use allocations 
must avoid to be societally beneficial. First, the use allocation 
must leave authors with sufficiently valuable rights. The authors 
must retain the right to veto at least some transactions to profit 
from the expression. This profit, indeed, is the sine qua non of 
copyright law, for it must generate the incentives for authors to 
create. Thus, the public use (or fair use) privilege cannot be so 
large as to eliminate all profit and thereby destroy the incentives 
to create. 
Second, adjudicating use divisions is not costless. Use divi-
sions are not easily administered, and judicial resources in resol-
ving disputes over the use privilege may be significant. For a use 
allocation to be efficient, the use privilege must not be so difficult 
to administer as to dissipate all the ex ante transaction cost sav-
ings in ex post judicial administration costs. 
In the next Part, we examine how a doctrine of fair use can 
achieve a superior allocation of rights without eliminating the in-
centives to create and without creating excessive judicial admin-
istrative costs. 
III.  A NEW DOCTRINE OF FAIR USE 
In this Part, we argue that the best way to implement the 
division of legal protections created by the dual-grant theory of 
fair use is to allocate uses to ultimate users in discrete categories 
that are relatively easy to identify, that do not require excessive 
amounts of private information, that provide some identifiable 
widespread value across the public (that is not exclusive to the 
actual user of the expression), and that are not so great as to cross 
the margin at which the author loses incentives to create. Fair 
use doctrine is the mechanism by which the law allocates directly 
to users those uses with the greatest net societal benefit from di-
rect allocation and removes them from the grant of exclusive 
rights to the author. 
Drawing on this approach, we present the actual doctrine of 
fair use we propose, drawing from the theory we expounded in the 
previous Part. We present both an idealized doctrine and a more 
realistic one, compare them to existing doctrine, and illustrate 
our proposed doctrine with several examples. Focusing on the me-
chanics of our proposal, we pay particular attention to the way 
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uses might be categorized as presumptively fair. We begin by con-
trasting our proposal with extant fair use doctrine. 
A. The Extant Doctrine of Fair Use 
Fair use is one of the most widely litigated and amorphous 
doctrines in the law118 and has been part of US copyright law at 
least since 1841119 (and much longer than that, according to some 
scholars120). Its modern form is codified in § 107 of the Copyright 
Act. Section 107 does not give clear guidance on when uses of a 
copyrighted work should be considered “fair” and therefore legally 
permitted without license from the owner. Rather, § 107 gives 
courts a list of illustrative purposes of fair use—“criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research”—and four factors to con-
sider in determining whether the use is fair: (1) “the purpose and 
character of the [allegedly fair] use”; (2) “the nature of the copy-
righted work;” (3) “the amount and substantiality of the portion” 
of the copyrighted work used by the allegedly fair use; and (4) “the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the co-
pyrighted work.”121 
In a classic article, Judge Pierre Leval highlighted the short-
comings of both the statutory formulation and the cases that im-
plement it: 
What is most curious about this doctrine is that neither the 
decisions that have applied it for nearly 300 years, nor its 
eventual statutory formulation, undertook to define or ex-
plain its contours or objectives. . . . [They] furnish little guid-
ance on how to recognize fair use. The statute, for example, 
directs us to examine the “purpose and character” of the sec-
ondary use as well as “the nature of the copyrighted work.” 
Beyond stating a preference for the critical, educational, and 
 
 118 See Nimmer, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 266–67 (cited in note 2) (highlighting the 
number of Supreme Court decisions interpreting fair use). 
 119 See generally, for example, Folsom v Marsh, 9 F Cases 342 (CCD Mass 1841). 
 120 See William Patry, How to Fix Copyright 215 (Oxford 2011) (tracing the origins of 
the fair use doctrine back to the 1710 Statute of Anne in England); Matthew Sag, The 
Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 Brooklyn L Rev 1371, 1387–93 (2011) (arguing that the devel-
opment of fair use “predates Folsom v. Marsh by at least 100 years”); Kylie Pappalardo 
and Brian Fitzgerald, Copyright, Fair Use and the Australian Constitution, in Brian 
Fitzgerald and John Gilchrist, eds, Copyright Perspectives: Past, Present and Prospect 
125, 129–30 (Springer 2015) (tracing the English history of copyright law to 1740 and 
noting how the English cases informed the American doctrine of fair use). 
 121 17 USC § 107. 
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nonprofit over the commercial, the statute tells little about 
what to look for in the “purpose and character” of the second-
ary use. It gives no clues at all regarding the significance of 
“the nature of” the copyrighted work. Although it instructs 
us to be concerned with the quantity and importance of the 
materials taken and with the effect of the use on the potential 
for copyright profits, it provides no guidance for distinguish-
ing between acceptable and excessive levels. Finally, alth-
ough leaving open the possibility that other factors may bear 
on the question, the statute identifies none. 
Curiously, judges generally have neither complained of the 
absence of guidance, nor made substantial efforts to fill the 
void. Uttering confident conclusions as to whether the partic-
ular taking was or was not a fair use, courts have treated the 
definition of the doctrine as assumed common ground. 
The assumption of common ground is mistaken. Judges do 
not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. . . . The 
opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning of fair 
use. Decisions are not governed by consistent principles, but 
seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual 
fact patterns. Justification is sought in notions of fairness, 
often more responsive to the concerns of private property 
than to the objectives of copyright.122 
Case law tends to focus on the four factors in determining 
whether a use is fair, but decisions are far from uniform. Recent 
years have seen courts paying growing attention to whether the 
allegedly fair use is transformative; transformativeness has thus 
become a key element in all four factors.123 However, other fea-
tures of the cases, such as market analysis, remain important, 
making outcomes difficult to predict.124 
One outstanding feature of current case law is the degree to 
which the four factors are pliable. Consider, for instance, the 
 
 122 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv L Rev 1105, 1105–07 
(1990) (citations omitted). 
 123 Sag, 73 Ohio St L J at 76–77 (cited in note 8); Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 605–06 
(cited in note 1). 
 124 See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm & Mary 
L Rev 1525, 1666 (2004) (describing the unpredictable nature of fair use and calling it “a 
lottery argument”). See also Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 
93 Iowa L Rev 1271, 1284 (2008) (modeling the similar uncertainty surrounding an indiv-
idual’s ex ante determination of whether a particular use of a copyrighted work will qualify 
as a fair use); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 Notre Dame L Rev 167, 
192 (2005). 
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treatment of the third factor (the amount and substantiality of 
the portion of the copyrighted work used by the allegedly fair use). 
Some courts have found that using the entirety of the copyrighted 
work is no great hindrance to a finding of fair use,125 while others 
have found the use of much smaller amounts of the original work 
to be critical to the denial of a finding of fair use.126 In most cases, 
courts analyze the proportion of the original work that has been 
used127—but there have been cases in which courts have looked 
instead at the proportion of the new, allegedly fair work that was 
copied from the original.128 While hard guidelines on proportions 
have been suggested129 and even incorporated in nonbinding 
 
 125 See, for example, Swatch Group Management Services Ltd v Bloomberg LP, 756 
F3d 73, 90 (2d Cir 2014); Authors Guild, Inc v HathiTrust, 755 F3d 87, 98 (2d Cir 2014) 
(holding that copying entire books did not prevent a finding of fair use because it was 
necessary to enable full-text searching); A.V. v iParadigms, LLC, 562 F3d 630, 642 (4th 
Cir 2009) (noting that the use of a work in its entirety was not dispositive of fair use); Bill 
Graham Archives v Dorling Kindersley Ltd, 448 F3d 605, 613 (2d Cir 2006); Chicago Board 
of Education v Substance, Inc, 354 F3d 624, 629 (7th Cir 2003). 
 126 See, for example, Ringgold v Black Entertainment Television, Inc, 126 F3d 70, 75–
77 (2d Cir 1997) (finding that a 26.75-second exposure of the plaintiff ’s posters on a tele-
vision show weighed against a finding of fair use); Allen-Myland, Inc v International Busi-
ness Machines Corp, 746 F Supp 520, 534–35 (ED Pa 1990); Iowa State University Re-
search Foundation, Inc v American Broadcasting Companies, Inc, 621 F2d 57, 61–62 (2d 
Cir 1980) (holding that a defendant’s use of 8 percent of a film in its broadcasts was sig-
nificant and concluding that a fair use defense was unavailable). 
 127 See, for example, Arrow Productions, Ltd v Weinstein Co, 44 F Supp 3d 359, 371 
(SDNY 2014) (comparing the length of three scenes from a copyrighted movie with the 
overall length of the movie); NXIVM Corp v The Ross Institute, 364 F3d 471, 480–81 (2d 
Cir 2004) (comparing the amount copied from a copyrighted work with the work’s total 
length); Wright v Warner Books, Inc, 953 F2d 731, 738–39 (2d Cir 1991) (comparing the 
quotations taken from a copyrighted book with the length of the book itself); New Era Pub-
lications International, ApS v Carol Publishing Group, 904 F2d 152, 158–59 (2d Cir 1990). 
 128 See, for example, Salinger v Random House, Inc, 811 F2d 90, 98–99 (2d Cir 1987) 
(noting that copyrighted material appeared on 40 percent of an infringing book’s pages); 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 564–66 (1985); Meeropol 
v Nizer, 560 F2d 1061, 1070–71 (2d Cir 1977) (finding it significant that copyrighted letters 
comprised a substantial portion of promotional materials for an infringing book although 
they made up less than 1 percent of the book itself). 
 129 See Gregory K. Klingsporn, The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future 
of Fair Use Guidelines, 23 Colum-VLA J L & Arts 101, 113 (1999); Kenneth D. Crews, The 
Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 Ohio St L J 599, 630–31 (2001) 
(highlighting the minutely detailed CONFU multimedia guidelines for educational use). 
01 BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY_ART_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  1:49 PM 
2016] The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use 1083 
 
guidelines,130 many cases suggest that the very idea of hard guide-
lines is an affront to the nature of fair use.131 
Recent years have seen some refinement of the thesis that 
fair use is in doctrinal disarray. In a study of fair use opinions 
from the years 1978–2005, Professor Barton Beebe found that ju-
dicial applications of the doctrine were surprisingly stable over 
time and even displayed some resistance to changes in doctrine 
announced by the Supreme Court.132 However, Beebe also found 
some manipulation of the four statutory factors, as well as some 
variance in the way the factors were interpreted.133 Using these 
findings, Professor Pamela Samuelson emphasized the degree to 
which extant fair use law is clustered around what she called 
“policy-relevant” patterns.134 Essentially, Samuelson argued that 
much of the apparent disarray of existing fair use doctrine disap-
pears if we note that courts’ approaches to fair use cases depend 
almost entirely on the category to which the allegedly “fair” use 
belongs. Unfortunately, the picture of policy-relevant categories 
is not entirely clean. Samuelson identified a large number of pol-
icy categories—“promoting freedom of speech and of expression, 
the ongoing progress of authorship, learning, access to information, 
 
 130 Parchomovsky and Goldman, 93 Va L Rev at 1505–06 (cited in note 40) (detailing 
the Classroom Guidelines that found a place in the House Report accompanying the Copy-
right Act); Crews, 62 Ohio St L J at 637 (cited in note 129) (contending that the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) guidelines of 1979 
had strong legislative authority backing them, more so because they were built on the foun-
dation of the judicial precedent of Williams & Wilkins Co v United States, 487 F2d 1345 (Ct 
Cl 1973)). 
 131 See Cambridge University Press v Patton, 769 F3d 1232, 1273 (11th Cir 2014), 
quoting Campbell, 510 US at 584 (“[T]o treat the Classroom Guidelines as indicative of 
what is allowable would be to create the type of ‘hard evidentiary presumption’ that the 
Supreme Court has cautioned against, because fair use must operate as a ‘sensitive bal-
ancing of interests.’”); Perfect 10, Inc v Amazon.com, Inc, 508 F3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cir 
2007), quoting Campbell, 510 US at 577 (“We must be flexible in applying a fair use analysis; 
it ‘is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, 
calls for case-by-case analysis.’”); Basic Books, Inc v Kinko’s Graphics Corp, 758 F Supp 1522, 
1537 (SDNY 1991) (“We . . . refuse to hold that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited 
without a fair use analysis.”). 
 132 See Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 621–22 (cited in note 1). 
 133 See id at 610, 614–15, 622. 
 134 See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 Fordham L Rev 2537, 2541–42 
(2009). Samuelson acknowledges her intellectual debt to earlier attempts to divide fair use 
into clusters. Id at 2541 n 27, citing Madison, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1645–65 (cited in 
note 124), Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Study No 14, Subcommittee on 
Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th 
Cong, 2d Sess 8–14 (1960), Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 Colum J L & Arts 433, 
439–41 (2008), and William F. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 64–259 
(BNA 2d ed 1995). 
01 BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY_ART_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  1:49 PM 
1084  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1051 
   
truth telling or truth seeking, competition, technological innova-
tion, and privacy and autonomy interests of users”—some originat-
ing in the language of § 107 and others originating in case law.135 
B. An Idealized New Doctrine of Fair Use 
The pliability surrounding the working of the fair use doct-
rine necessitates clear earmarking of permitted uses, in line with 
our proposal of dual grants. Legislators can implement the dual-
grant theory in two ideal ways: author-centered and user-centered. 
Unfortunately, neither of these ideal approaches is workable in re-
ality, leaving legislators to choose an imperfect compromise. 
An author-centered approach would explicitly key fair use to 
the quantity and quality of the grants of rights to authors. Any 
expansion of author rights would automatically lead to an expan-
sion of fair use. If, for instance, Congress were to grant an addi-
tional twenty years of copyright protection to owners—as it did in 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act136—courts would 
automatically expand fair use to recapture uses for the public and 
to restore the balance of the dual grant. The scope of fair use 
would move up and down in lockstep with changes in the grant of 
rights to authors. 
A user-centered approach, by contrast, would grant large 
chunks of presumably fair uses directly to the public. These 
grants of uses and changes in the scope of fair use would, in turn, 
affect the rights of authors. An expansion of fair use would expand 
authors’ rights, and a contraction of fair use would shrink au-
thors’ rights. 
Unfortunately, both ideal approaches suffer from a huge 
flaw—they are very expensive to administer. Both ideals demand 
constant vigilance. The world of copyright is already in continu-
ous flux due to technological innovations, market developments, 
and legal changes. To match user privileges to owner rights (or 
vice versa), courts would have to monitor all these changes and 
update standards on a regular basis. 
The law of copyright thus adopts a compromise. Both user 
privileges and author rights are defined with respect to uses ra-
ther than by comparison with one another. The rights granted to 
authors are defined in terms of specific acts (such as copying or 
 
 135 Samuelson, 77 Fordham L Rev at 2541–42 (cited in note 134). 
 136 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act § 102, 112 Stat at 2827–28. 
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performing) for specified times. The privileges granted to users 
are defined more vaguely, though, we argue, no less broadly. 
Although user privileges and author rights are defined sepa-
rately by statute,137 their interrelationship ought to be borne in 
mind by courts. Specifically, courts must be sensitive to the 
breadth of author rights when they define uses as fair or not. An 
expansion in author rights should be accompanied by a corre-
sponding judicial openness to new claims of fair use. 
C. A Proposed New Doctrine of Fair Use 
Since it is impracticable to create a fair use standard that is 
precisely matched to author rights, we propose a simplified set of 
fair use rules that make fair use easier to apply and more oriented 
toward achieving allocative efficiency, even if the doctrine is inca-
pable of precisely measuring the set of rights necessary for author 
incentives. These fair use rules could be applied by judges within 
the existing fair use framework, given its pliability. 
1. Two steps and four factors. 
Our proposed doctrine cuts through the confusion by refocus-
ing courts on two basic questions. Under our proposal, courts 
would evaluate fair use claims through a two-step process. In the 
first step, the fair use claimant (the alleged infringer) would est-
ablish a prima facie right to use the fair use defense by showing 
that the use falls within certain privileged categories—political 
speech, truth seeking, or any other category of uses that produces 
widespread nonpecuniary follow-on benefits for nonusers. In the 
second step, the owner of the copyright would have the oppor-
tunity to rebut the fair use defense by showing that granting the 
fair use claim in this and similar cases would have the effect of 
denying the minimal incentives necessary for creation of this 
work. 
Importantly, our proposal would easily accommodate the four 
statutory factors that § 107 of the Copyright Act indicates should 
guide courts in their decisions. In our proposed doctrine, two of 
the factors would be examined to determine whether the use was 
prima facie privileged, while the other two would help the court 
figure out whether recognizing the use as fair would eliminate the 
incentives for creation. 
 
 137 See 17 USC § 107 (codifying users’ fair use rights); 17 USC § 106 (identifying copy-
rights owners’ exclusive rights). 
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Part one of a court’s fair use determination, in our proposed 
doctrine, would require the court to decide whether the use is 
within a privileged category by evaluating the purpose and char-
acter of the allegedly fair use (factor one). The court would also 
have to pay attention to “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion”138 of the copyrighted work used by the allegedly fair use 
(factor three) to determine whether the claimed use actually 
matched reality. Consider, for instance, a decision by the political 
campaign of Harry to distribute for free the autobiography of his 
opponent Bernice, in order to criticize Bernice’s onetime support 
for socialism. It is clear that this is a political use, which is a use 
that is prima facie privileged in our proposed doctrine. However, 
Bernice might convincingly argue that Harry could have achieved 
his proposed political use by distributing portions of the autobio-
graphy rather than the whole work. A court convinced of the mer-
its of Bernice’s claim would determine that Harry had not estab-
lished the prima facie validity of use, since the distribution of the 
entire work could not be reconciled with the privileged purpose. 
Part two of a court’s fair use determination, in our proposed 
doctrine, would involve an assessment of whether recognizing the 
proposed use as fair would, in the context of the work, eliminate 
sufficient incentives for creation. Naturally, this examination 
would have to consider the effect of the proposed fair use “upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”139 (fac-
tor four), and the extent to which nonmarket factors might suffi-
ciently motivate the creation of this kind of work (factor two). 
However, the court would examine these elements to determine 
only whether the proposed fair use is so extreme as to eliminate 
the incentives to create the work. In making this determination, 
the court would consider not only the particular use engaged in 
by the defendant, but also the effect on incentives to create the 
work if similar users with similar uses could likewise enjoy the 
protection of the fair use doctrine.140 
Consider again Harry’s use of Bernice’s autobiography. A 
court would have to examine how Harry’s distribution of parts of 
Bernice’s autobiography, and like distribution by other candi-
dates or political opponents of Bernice, would affect the market 
 
 138 17 USC § 107(3). 
 139 17 USC § 107(4). 
 140 If the court failed to consider the effects of similar uses, our doctrine would create 
a perverse situation in which the same type of use would be fair for an early user, but not 
fair for a later user. 
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for Bernice’s book. However, finding a significant adverse effect 
on the market would not constitute sufficient reason to defeat a 
claim of fair use. Rather, the court would have to determine that 
if all Bernice’s opponents were to distribute portions of the auto-
biography without license, Bernice would lack sufficient incentive 
to publish the autobiography in the first place. Here, the nature 
of the work would be particularly important, because a court 
might readily determine that the incentives for production of a 
political autobiography are not primarily pecuniary. 
2. Privileged uses. 
The key to our proposed fair use doctrine is a list of privileged 
uses that are presumptively fair. A court’s determination that a 
use is presumptively fair greatly increases the likelihood that the 
defendant will succeed in a fair use defense; it will not be easy for 
a copyright owner to show that recognizing the fair use claim 
would suffice to eliminate incentives to create the work. 
What types of uses should be recognized as presumptively 
fair in our proposed doctrine? As we noted in Part II.B, fair use 
doctrine should aim to privilege uses in discrete categories that 
are relatively easy to identify and that provide some identifiable, 
widespread value across the public that is not exclusive to the ac-
tual user of the expression. Our aim is to identify those uses that 
create utility not only for the direct user of the expression but also 
for many others. Stated differently, we seek uses of expressive 
works in which the uses themselves create identifiable and widely 
spread positive externalities. The list of privileged uses must take 
account of the needs of administrable doctrine as well. The nature 
of the use that is privileged must not rely on private information, 
for example. 
In this Section, we propose several obvious candidates for the 
list of privileged uses and also explore several categories of uses 
that are already important in current fair use litigation. Our theory 
does not always direct courts to find fair use. In fact, it calls into 
question many aspects of fair use jurisprudence, as it currently 
exists. At the same time, our theory directs courts to find fair use 
in many instances that would not be recognized as such under 
extant case law. Together, these categories demonstrate how our 
approach requires us to rethink some foundational notions that 
have shaped fair use law. 
a) Political speech.  The most obvious example of a privi-
leged category for fair use doctrine is political speech. Political 
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speech is already conferred an exalted status in First Amendment 
doctrine141 and for very important reasons. Political speech is an 
integral ingredient in self-governance, and therefore it is critical 
to the functioning of democracy.142 From an economic point of view, 
the social value of political speech is somewhat difficult to describe. 
Professor Robert Cooter suggests that political speech should be 
seen as a kind of “merit good”;143 Professor Richard Musgrave con-
troversially developed the term “merit goods” to describe goods 
that individuals in society “need” notwithstanding their unwill-
ingness to pay.144 Specifically, Cooter argues that free speech en-
hances societal liberty (and therefore utility) in a manner that is 
greater than the public’s preference for consuming the good.145 
But it is not necessary for us to endorse this controversial theory 
in order to establish that political speech is a valuable category 
for prima facie protection under fair use doctrine. It is enough for 
us to note that political uses of speech are thought to promote self-
governance in a democratic society, and thus create widespread 
nonpecuniary follow-on benefits throughout society. These bene-
fits accrue not only to the political speaker but to many others 
that do not directly use the expression. Political speech thus falls 
directly within our definition of categories for prima facie protection. 
Controversies regarding fair use and the political use of 
speech have arisen in the past. One journalist has gone so far as 
to say, “If you’re a candidate for president, there’s a good chance 
you’ve been sued—or at least threatened—by a musician . . . [for] 
using popular songs at [your] campaign rallies.”146 The American 
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) has pub-
lished guidelines urging politicians to purchase licenses to use 
music in their campaign rallies; the guidelines do not reference 
the possibility of a fair use claim.147 
 
 141 See BeVier, 30 Stan L Rev at 309 (cited in note 18). 
 142 Brown v Hartlage, 456 US 45, 60 (1982) (noting that the First Amendment func-
tions “as the guardian of our democracy”); Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The 
Constitutional Powers of the People 24–25 (Harper & Brothers 1960). 
 143 Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 313 (Princeton 2000). 
 144 Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy 
13–15 (McGraw-Hill 1959). 
 145 Cooter, The Strategic Constitution at 310–12 (cited in note 143). 
 146 Joel Rose, Music in Political Campaigns 101 (NPR Music, Feb 29, 2012), online at 
http://www.npr.org/sections/therecord/2012/02/29/147592568/music-in-political-campaigns 
-101 (visited Jan 22, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 147 Using Music in Political Campaigns: What You Should Know (ASCAP), archived 
at http://perma.cc/9MQ7-2E2S. Interestingly, Professor Rebecca Tushnet argues that pol-
itical uses of songs are almost inherently transformative and thus should be judged fair 
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Our theory suggests that all political uses of expressions 
should be presumptive fair uses. This does not mean that political 
speech should be unprotected by copyright law; the fair use doc-
trine protects uses, rather than entire expressions. Thus, a com-
mercial use of a political tract by Newt Gingrich would infringe 
Gingrich’s copyright, while a political use of a Fleetwood Mac song 
would presumptively be a fair use even if the song had nothing 
whatsoever to do with political affairs. 
Our approach would constitute a departure from extant jur-
isprudence. This is best seen by reexamining one of the Supreme 
Court’s most important pronouncements on the scope of fair use—
its ruling in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enter-
prises.148 Harper & Row involved the publication of a news story 
by The Nation that included between three and four hundred 
words of unlicensed quotations from former President Gerald 
Ford’s A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford. 
Drawing directly from the autobiography, the story in The Nation 
described Ford’s perspective on his decision to pardon former 
President Richard Nixon of all crimes related to the Watergate 
affair.149 The Court acknowledged that The Nation was engaging 
in news reporting and that First Amendment concerns came into 
play, particularly since Ford was a public figure and the speech 
concerned politics.150 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court dismissed 
The Nation’s claim of fair use and found that The Nation had un-
lawfully infringed on Harper & Row’s copyright in the Ford auto-
biography by copying text without a license.151 
Two factors appeared to weigh heavily on the Court in its con-
siderations. First, Harper & Row had sold to Time for $25,000 the 
right to publish an excerpt of the autobiography prior to publica-
tion of the book as a whole. The 7,500-word excerpt in Time would 
have concerned Ford’s pardon of Nixon. However, after The Na-
tion’s “scoop,” Time cancelled the contract and refused to make 
payment on the outstanding $12,500, because there was little 
news value to the excerpt after The Nation story appeared.152 The 
Court viewed this as clear evidence of the fact that the claimed 
 
uses in a fair use doctrine that protects transformative uses. See Tushnet, 114 Yale L J at 
572–73 (cited at note 61). From our perspective, the transformativeness of the use is nei-
ther here nor there. A political use is prima facie fair, whether transformative or not. 
 148 471 US 539 (1985). 
 149 Id at 542–45. 
 150 Id at 555–60. 
 151 Id at 569. 
 152 Harper & Row, 471 US at 542–43. 
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fair use had imposed a significant cost on the market for the 
work.153 
Second, Harper & Row had not yet published the full autobiog-
raphy. Rather, the autobiography’s first appearance was in the 
quotations within The Nation’s news story, violating what the 
Court labeled the “author’s control of first public distribution.”154 
While the Court acknowledged that “first publication” by an unli-
censed user should not be an absolute bar to a claim of fair use,155 
the Court also noted that fair use was traditionally understood to 
be based on the author’s implied consent to a “reasonable and cus-
tomary use,” and it was unlikely that authors would consent to 
giving a first-publication license to an uncoordinated news 
“scoop.”156 The Court thus suggested that the use was presump-
tively unfair. 
The Court’s approach in Harper & Row has been criticized for 
its miserliness toward fair use claims.157 In particular, critics have 
asked whether three to four hundred words should truly be con-
sidered a significant portion of a full-length autobiography.158 By 
refusing The Nation’s claim to fair use, the Court found the mar-
ket effects of unlicensed copying of an extremely small amount of 
the copyrighted work to be significant enough to warrant uphold-
ing the rights of the author. 
Under our approach, the Court would have to uphold the 
claim of fair use. Given The Nation’s use of the quotations for po-
litical speech, it would be unnecessary for the Court to engage in 
any extended analysis of the length of the quotations or the effect 
on prepublication contracts. The political use of the quotations 
would make The Nation’s use prima facie fair. As indicated by the 
very small portion of the original work used, it would not be pos-
sible to argue that The Nation had an ulterior motive in quoting 
 
 153 Id at 567. 
 154 Id at 555. 
 155 Id at 552–55. 
 156 Harper & Row, 471 US at 542, 550–51 (quotation marks omitted). 
 157 See, for example, Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, 
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 Wash & Lee L Rev 831, 860–61 (2010) (describing how 
the Court “got it wrong” in Harper & Row); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of 
Expression in Historical Perspective, 10 J Intel Prop L 319, 320–21 (2003) (highlighting the 
critical response to the Court’s decision and the congressional response); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 63–65 (Oxford 2008); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copy-
right, and Fair Use, 40 Vand L Rev 1, 64–65 (1987); Samuelson, 77 Fordham L Rev at 
2565 (cited in note 134). 
 158 See, for example, Bauer, 67 Wash & Lee L Rev at 860 (cited in note 157); Samuelson, 
77 Fordham L Rev at 2564 (cited in note 134). 
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the original. Indeed, The Nation might have directly excerpted far 
larger portions of the original and could still have credibly argued 
that its aim was to engage in political speech. Thus, the Court 
would be left to ask only whether the loss of prepublication con-
tracts (and the attendant diminution of the advance that would 
be offered by Harper & Row) would be sufficient to defeat the in-
centives for Ford to write his autobiography. The near-certain an-
swer would be “no.” Ford would certainly want to write his auto-
biography, even if Harper & Row had to reduce his advance fee 
by $25,000 or more.159 This is due not only to the continued ex-
pected market for the full autobiography but also to the presumed 
interest of a retiring president in presenting his own version of 
his biography to the public. 
b) Truth seeking.  A second example of a privileged cate-
gory for fair use doctrine is truth seeking. What we mean by 
“truth seeking” is uses of copyrighted expressions that aim at es-
tablishing or identifying the truth of a matter. This category 
would encompass not only news reporting but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, research and teaching. 
Research and news reporting are not only explicitly men-
tioned in § 107 as two of the types of uses at which fair use is 
aimed,160 but they are also fairly well implied by the constitutional 
copyright scheme, which explicitly aims to promote “[s]cience,” or 
knowledge.161 This suggests that uses of expression aimed at es-
tablishing the truth of some matter should be treated as presump-
tively fair. Showing clips of a film in order to show that digital 
effects have troublesome color variations would therefore be pre-
sumptively within the scope of fair use, while using the same clips 
of film to promote the sale of DVDs would apparently be outside 
of fair use. 
Truth seeking produces clear follow-on benefits beyond the 
immediate users of a copyrighted expression. Science advances by 
 
 159 The figure a court would have to use in calculating the effect of a fair use finding 
on incentives is $25,000 because this represents the full value of the prepublication excerpt 
contract. The finding of fair use ex post would result in only the $12,500 cost of the ex post 
cancellation of the contract. However, if Harper & Row knew that all prepublication stories 
of the kind The Nation published would be found as fair use, and it knew that the ability 
to keep the manuscript under wraps until publication was limited, it would likely expect 
that it could not realize any gain from the sale of prepublication excerpts from political 
biographies. 
 160 17 USC § 107. 
 161 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 8. 
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cumulative understandings of examined phenomena. As ad-
vances are reported, others examining the same phenomena can 
incorporate the findings (or criticize them) in their own research. 
The same is true of history or news reporting. The aggregate 
growth in understanding benefits not only the particular person 
who uses any given copyrighted expression but also all others who 
benefit from the growth in knowledge. 
Deciding whether uses of an expression constitute truth seek-
ing may sound daunting and appear difficult to administer judi-
cially. Fortunately, judicial determinations of the use of the ex-
pressions in truth seeking are familiar from an entirely different 
context: the rules of evidence. More specifically, the admissibility 
of hearsay evidence depends crucially on the use to which it is 
put. Hearsay evidence is inadmissible when used to prove some 
propositions, but admissible to prove others. To rule on the ad-
missibility of hearsay, a judge must determine not only whether 
the evidence is used to prove the truth of a matter but also what 
particular matter it is being used to prove.162 The precise determi-
nation of the purpose of the use of truth-seeking speech in the 
context of fair use should therefore be a familiar one to courts, 
and one that they can carry out. 
As with political speech, extant case law fails to show suffi-
cient solicitousness to truth-seeking uses, which in our theory are 
presumptively treated as fair. Consider the case of American Geo-
physical Union v Texaco Inc.163 The case concerned the practices of 
hundreds of scientists working for the oil company Texaco in re-
search aimed at producing new products and technology in the 
petroleum industry. The scientists, working at several of Texaco’s 
research centers, photocopied articles they found of interest from 
journals to which the Texaco library subscribed. They used the 
articles for archival research purposes—that is, they kept the ar-
ticles on the shelf for consultation as they researched relevant 
topics.164 Acknowledging that the articles were copyrighted and 
that the photocopying was unlicensed, Texaco claimed fair use.165 
In analyzing the viability of the fair use defense, the Second Cir-
cuit—both the majority and the dissent—focused on the issue of 
transaction costs. The main inquiry was whether there existed a 
 
 162 Clifford S. Fishman, 4 Jones on Evidence: Civil and Criminal §§ 24:1, 24:6, 26:1, 
27:1, 28:2 (West 7th ed 2000). 
 163 60 F3d 913 (2d Cir 1994). 
 164 Id at 915. 
 165 Id at 914–15. 
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market mechanism that enabled research institutes to efficiently 
clear reproduction rights. The majority found that such a mecha-
nism existed in the form of the Copyright Clearance Center—a 
clearinghouse that dealt with copyrights in scientific publications 
on behalf of the publishers. Based on this finding, the majority 
rejected the defendant’s fair use defense.166 The dissent, by con-
trast, believed that the Copyright Clearance Center did not func-
tion effectively and that consequently it could not have been re-
lied on to streamline transactions between copyright owners and 
researchers. Hence, the dissent was willing to recognize a fair use 
defense.167 The case is a textbook example of how courts should 
work under the transaction cost view of fair use. It also provides 
a vivid illustration of the limitations of the transaction cost theory; 
after all, the majority and the dissent could not agree on the mag-
nitude of the cost of transacting in this case or whether it justified 
a finding of fair use. 
Our analysis points courts in a different direction. To us, the 
issue is not the level of transaction costs or the feasibility of mar-
ket transactions. Rather, it is the basic question whether archival 
research uses of works produce nonpecuniary benefits to nonus-
ers. Accordingly, the focus of the inquiry in Texaco should have 
been on the nature of the use. Specifically, the court should have 
inquired into whether the reproduction of the scientific articles 
significantly advances research projects (in which case the use 
should have been deemed fair) or is strictly for archival purposes 
unrelated to the advancement of research (in which case fair use 
should have been denied). The question whether there is a func-
tioning market for article reprints is largely beside the point. The 
only question that courts should address is whether archival stor-
age of the kind practiced by Texaco would defeat the incentives to 
produce the journal articles that were subject to litigation in the 
Texaco case. We would hazard a guess: not likely.168 
 
 166 Id at 929–32. 
 167 Texaco, 60 F3d at 940–41 (Jacobs dissenting). 
 168 The dissenting opinion by Judge Dennis Jacobs in Texaco considered this issue 
and concluded that the incentives provided by copyright law were sufficient to secure an 
exponential increase in scientific publications. Id at 940 (Jacobs dissenting). The majority 
opinion, on the other hand, did not examine in detail whether the publisher’s incentives 
would be considerably reduced by the infringing use in question. It observed only that 
“evidence concerning the effect of Texaco’s photocopying of individual articles . . . is of 
somewhat limited significance in determining and evaluating the effect . . . ‘upon the po-
tential market for or value of ’  the individual articles.” Id at 928. 
01 BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY_ART_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  1:49 PM 
1094  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:1051 
   
Digital libraries provide another interesting context in which 
fair use has been debated recently and on which our theory casts 
light. The issue has come up in a trio of cases: Authors Guild, Inc 
v Google Inc,169 Authors Guild, Inc v HathiTrust,170 and Cam-
bridge University Press v Becker.171 All three cases raised a com-
mon legal issue: What is the status of digital libraries under the 
fair use doctrine? Google, the most famous case of the three, con-
cerned the Google Books Library Project, Google’s scanning of 
twenty million books in order to include them in a fully searchable 
database.172 The second case, HathiTrust, involved a much 
smaller version of the same type of project. HathiTrust, a re-
search community that is comprised, inter alia, of several univer-
sities, had set up a searchable digital library.173 Finally, Becker 
addressed the legality of Georgia State University’s plan to put 
digital copies of books and other academic materials on electronic 
course reserves.174 
The first two cases—Google and HathiTrust—resulted in 
findings of fair use.175 In the third case, the district court also 
found fair use.176 However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit disap-
proved of the district court’s use of rigid quantitative benchmarks, 
such as allowing the use of one chapter or up to 10 percent of a 
work, and remanded the case back to the district court177 with 
clear instructions to adhere to the highly contextual and flexible 
approach adopted by other courts.178 In our analysis, all three 
cases reached (roughly) the correct result. 
The aggregation of copyrighted works to form a searchable 
database creates an unparalleled research tool that cannot be oth-
erwise duplicated. This means that the use of works in this fash-
ion should be considered a prima facie fair use until the point at 
which incentives to create are eliminated. In both Google and Ha-
thiTrust, the organizations putting together the databases em-
ployed sufficient restrictions to prevent the databases from serving 
 
 169 954 F Supp 2d 282 (SDNY 2013). 
 170 755 F3d 87 (2d Cir 2014). 
 171 863 F Supp 2d 1190 (ND Ga 2012). 
 172 Google, 954 F Supp 2d at 285–86. 
 173 It is noteworthy that HathiTrust also wished to grant access to the works to print-
disabled users and to ensure the preservation of the works in its database. See HathiTrust, 
755 F3d at 91. 
 174 Becker, 863 F Supp 2d at 1201. 
 175 Google, 954 F Supp 2d at 293–94; HathiTrust, 755 F3d at 101, 103. 
 176 Becker, 863 F Supp 2d at 1242–43, 1363–64. 
 177 Patton, 769 F3d at 1275, revg Becker, 863 F Supp 2d 1190. 
 178 Patton, 769 F3d at 1271–72, 1283. 
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as complete substitutes for the original works. Google Books, for 
example, limits the ability of database readers to see the full 
works; readers are able to see only “snippets” of the full text.179 
These restrictions mean that those who want to read a book will 
still have to purchase a copy; the main use of the database is to 
find relevant books or quotations regarding a point of interest. 
The reasoning of the Second Circuit in finding fair use in both 
Google and HathiTrust, particularly the special emphasis the 
judges put on public benefit, is highly consistent with our theory. 
The use of searchable digital depositories of copyrightable works 
creates immeasurable benefit for the public at large. In the words 
of Judge Denny Chin: 
The benefits of the Library Project are many. First, Google 
Books provides a new and efficient way for readers and re-
searchers to find books. . . . Second, in addition to being an 
important reference tool, Google Books greatly promotes a 
type of research referred to as “data mining” or “text mining.” 
. . . Third, Google Books expands access to books. In particu-
lar, traditionally underserved populations will benefit as 
they gain knowledge of and access to far more books. . . . 
Fourth, Google Books helps to preserve books and give them 
new life. . . . Finally, by helping readers and researchers iden-
tify books, Google Books benefits authors and publishers.180 
Importantly, the benefits listed by Chin lie outside any of the 
individual books included in the project, and no work on its own 
could produce them. Furthermore, the fact that Google allowed 
readers to view only small portions of the works without being able 
to reproduce them led Chin to conclude that the project “advances 
the progress of the arts and sciences, while maintaining respectful 
consideration for the rights of authors and other creative individ-
uals, and without adversely impacting the rights of copyright hold-
ers.”181 The same is true of the contested use in HathiTrust. 
The Georgia State case, by contrast, calls for a more cautious 
approach. The inclusion of digital copies in courses’ electronic re-
serves clearly provides a significant benefit to students. It is con-
ceivable that some of this benefit comes in the form of advancing 
research, but a better way of characterizing the use is educational 
(or teaching), which is a category we address below. As we note, 
 
 179 Google, 954 F Supp 2d at 286–87. 
 180 Id at 287–88. 
 181 Id at 293. 
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it is not certain that the category ought to be treated as entitled 
to the status of a prima facie fair use. Additionally, if universities 
and other educational institutions were permitted under the 
scope of fair use to include complete copies of mandatory, copy-
righted course materials in course portals, it is likely that au-
thors’ incentives to create at least some of these works would be 
in jeopardy. Thus, a more contextual approach is warranted. 
As the Georgia State case shows, the categories of claimed 
fair uses will not always be crystal clear. For instance, there will 
naturally be some cases in which the categories of truth seeking 
and political speech overlap. Harper & Row can be considered 
such a case. It involved the use of copyrighted expression to report 
the news; the news it involved was essentially political, and it 
thus concerned political speech. In our view, this simply makes 
the Harper & Row case easier to identify as one involving a pre-
sumptively fair use of an expression. Once the use is presump-
tively fair, it is not relevant whether it is presumptively fair due 
to one or several categories. Likewise, there is no need to charac-
terize the intensity of the use in order to establish the presump-
tion of fair use. The only question remaining for the court—re-
gardless of whether Harper & Row is treated as a case of 
presumptive fair use due to news reporting or due to political 
speech—is whether recognizing the specific kind of fair use would 
eliminate the incentives for creation. 
c) Criticism and comment.  Although we have noted that 
there is no reason to restrict the categories of presumptive fair 
use specifically to those mentioned in the first paragraph of § 107, 
there is likewise no good reason to automatically discount § 107. 
Section 107 offers an illustrative list of fair use purposes: “criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple cop-
ies for classroom use), scholarship, [and] research.”182 We have al-
ready assimilated scholarship, research, and news reporting into 
our analysis within the broader framework of truth seeking. We 
now turn to the remaining trio of criticism, comment, and teaching. 
Criticism and comment, in our minds, can be lumped together 
as uses aimed at evaluating existing works for a wider audience. 
In essence, criticism and comment allow an audience to experi-
ence a work indirectly, through the medium of a different user’s 
reaction to it. Audiences can also combine direct and indirect ex-
periences, consuming the work together with the user’s opinion of 
 
 182 17 USC § 107. 
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it. For instance, a listener may read a critical review of a musical 
performance while listening to a recording of it to help herself 
form her own opinion of the piece or to compare notes with the 
critic. 
In one sense, all criticism produces follow-on benefits for non-
users. The critic records her impressions of the copyrighted work 
for others to consume, rather than simply for herself. At the same 
time, criticism does not neatly fall into the category of a use that 
provides widespread nonpecuniary follow-on benefits among non-
users. In many cases, the consumption of criticism is localized 
among users of the copyrighted work itself. In the most extreme 
cases, the criticism and comment are enjoyed solely by those who 
are consumers of the original work. Some kinds of works by fans 
of cult television series, for instance, can be enjoyed only by those 
who have already experienced every second of every episode of the 
series. That group will almost always be very small and the ben-
efits will not be widespread. Criticism and comment are therefore 
controversial candidates for categories of prima facie fair uses in 
our theory. 
Altogether, we come out on the side of treating criticism and 
comment as prima facie fair uses—but it is worth adding two notes. 
First, recall the classic case of Folsom v Marsh,183 which introduced 
the English rule of fair use to American jurisprudence. The case 
involved a two-volume biography of President George Washington, 
comprised almost entirely of copied letters and interstitial text. 
The interstitial text was new, but the copied letters were used 
without license, and they comprised 353 (!) pages of the text.184 
While the case has been cited for a number of propositions, the 
most important for our purposes is the court’s reliance on a line 
between, on the one hand, good faith use of the original “for the 
purposes of fair and reasonable criticism,” and on the other hand, 
using the original “with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede 
the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it.”185 
Even if we recognize criticism and comment as prima facie fair 
uses, there will still be cases in which courts should reject the claim 
that the infringing use is actually criticism and comment. In some 
cases, as in Folsom, the court should recognize that the claim of 
criticism and comment is merely a subterfuge. Interestingly, from 
the point of view of our theory, Folsom involved a different category 
 
 183 9 F Cases 342 (CCD Mass 1841). 
 184 See id at 345. 
 185 Id at 344–45. 
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of use—political speech, rather than criticism and comment. None-
theless, the result should be the same. It is not credible that the 
wholesale copying of 353 pages involved a good faith writing of a 
biography of Washington for political purposes. 
Second, even if one were to reject our classification of criti-
cism and comment as prima facie fair uses, it would not follow 
that criticism and comment should fall outside the scope of fair 
use altogether. As we noted earlier, our theory is intended to be 
cumulative. It still makes sense under our theory to allow the de-
fendant to prove that a finding of fair use is warranted when ex-
cessive transaction costs are expected to block a socially optimal 
transaction. 
d) Education.  Educational uses, too, make a mixed case 
for recognition as prima facie fair uses. “Teaching” is explicitly 
mentioned in § 107 as a fair use purpose. However, it is not en-
tirely clear that education neatly fits within the description of a 
use that produces widespread nonpecuniary benefits for nonus-
ers. Education is generally a bilateral transaction between 
teacher and student (or multiple students); the users of educa-
tional copyrighted materials, whether teachers or students, are 
the beneficiaries. In this sense, there is little reason to include 
education as a prima facie category of fair use. On the other hand, 
education is widely thought to create societal benefits beyond 
those conferred on the direct participants in and beneficiaries of 
education, for example, a reduction in crime.186 Additionally, edu-
cation has a clear and obvious connection with uses that are 
prima facie fair uses in our theory, such as truth seeking. 
We suggest that the stronger argument would omit education 
from a list of prima facie fair uses. Fair use in educational settings 
could be claimed, therefore, only when the use could fairly be cat-
egorized as political speech, research, truth seeking, criticism, or 
another prima facie fair use, or when the use was small enough 
that it could be justified by a transaction cost argument. This 
would still allow for a wide scope of fair uses in educational set-
tings, but not nearly as many as for political speech, for instance. 
Our approach would accord with a number of recent decisions 
that have been conservative with findings of fair use in education 
 
 186 See generally Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education on 
Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports, 94 Am Econ Rev 155 
(2004); Stephen Machin, Olivier Marie, and Sunčica Vujić, The Crime Reducing Effect of 
Education, 121 Econ J 463 (2011). 
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settings. A series of cases in the 1980s and 1990s dealt with pho-
tocopying materials for university classes.187 Courts were gener-
ally unsympathetic to the claim that universities and copy shops 
could, within the framework of fair use, photocopy all the course 
materials needed by a student for a given class.188 Negotiations 
between some of the interested parties led to two sets of informal 
guidelines for determining whether course-related copying is fair: 
the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-
Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Period-
icals189 and the Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music.190 The 
guidelines include research within the category of educational 
uses; we would separate the two categories. Otherwise, however, 
the guidelines are largely positive from our perspective. They at-
tempt to demark uses that are sufficiently small to warrant a 
finding of fair use. In many cases, the guidelines offer quantita-
tive benchmarks. This is a means of offering greater certainty 
within a transaction cost analysis of fair use.191 While the two sets 
of guidelines have not been adopted into law in any formal pro-
ceeding, they have received largely sympathetic treatment in case 
law.192 In some ways, the Georgia State case mentioned above also 
reflects this approach. 
D. Other Illustrations of the Proposed Fair Use Doctrine 
To further illustrate how our proposed doctrine would work, 
and to contrast it with existing doctrine, we also consider several 
issues that have arisen in prior fair use litigation that do not nec-
essarily fall into categories of prima facie fair uses. Applying the 
proposed new test to some old cases provides some interesting re-
sults, confirming the results in some cases and rejecting them in 
others. 
 
 187 See Princeton University Press v Michigan Document Services, Inc, 99 F3d 1381, 
1383 (6th Cir 1996) (en banc); Blackwell Publishing, Inc v Excel Research Group, LLC, 661 
F Supp 2d 786, 788 (ED Mich 2009); Basic Books, 758 F Supp at 1526. 
 188 See, for example, Princeton University Press, 99 F3d at 1391; Blackwell Publish-
ing, 661 F Supp 2d at 794; Basic Books, 758 F Supp at 1534–37. 
 189 See generally Copyright Law Revision, HR Rep No 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 
68–70 (1976). 
 190 See id at 70–71. See also Crews, 62 Ohio St L J at 615–20 (cited in note 129). 
 191 See Parchomovsky and Goldman, 93 Va L Rev at 1506–08 (cited in note 40). 
 192 See, for example, Princeton University Press, 99 F3d at 1390–91; Texaco, 60 F3d 
at 919 n 5; Marcus v Rowley, 695 F2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir 1983). 
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1. Parodies. 
Courts applying fair use have long struggled with the ques-
tion of how to treat parodies. Perhaps the best illustration of the 
courts’ confusion can be found in two Ninth Circuit cases decided 
by the same judge in 1955. Both Jack Benny and Sid Caesar had 
parodied movies on their television shows: Benny’s sketch paro-
died the film Gaslight,193 and Caesar’s parodied From Here to 
Eternity.194 While there was little to distinguish the two parodies, 
the court approved Caesar’s as fair use while rejecting Benny’s as 
an unacceptable unlicensed appropriation of a copyrighted work.195 
Along the way, the court in each case emphasized that its central 
concern was with the amount of material used by the parody, ra-
ther than the style or target of the humorous work. In Benny’s case, 
for example, the court noted that “the words ‘burlesque,’ ‘parody,’ 
‘satire’ and ‘travesty’ are often used interchangeably.”196 
A new course was charted by the Supreme Court in Campbell. 
Campbell involved an infringement suit by the holder of the copy-
right in the song “Oh, Pretty Woman” (composed by Roy Orbison 
and Bill Dees) against the rap group 2 Live Crew. 2 Live Crew re-
leased to the public a song entitled “Pretty Woman” that borrowed 
extensively from Orbison’s hit without permission.197 While 2 Live 
Crew acknowledged seeking and failing to obtain permission from 
the copyright owner, the Supreme Court found the rap group’s 
use of the original could be a fair use and therefore noninfringing. 
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice David Souter explained 
that 2 Live Crew’s song “reasonably could be perceived as com-
menting on the original or criticizing it.”198 He argued that paro-
dists have a special claim to fair use for two reasons. First, origi-
nal authors are unlikely to license parodies of their works.199 
Second, parodies are especially valuable to society on account of 
their transformative nature.200 Importantly, the Court denied 
that all parodic works were of equal value. The Court took pains 
to distinguish the favored parodies from the less protected satires. 
 
 193 Loew’s Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F Supp 165, 167 (SD Cal 1955). 
 194 Columbia Pictures Corp v National Broadcasting Co, 137 F Supp 348, 351–52 (SD 
Cal 1955). 
 195 Contrast Loew’s Inc, 131 F Supp at 183, with Columbia Pictures Corp, 137 F Supp 
at 353–54. 
 196 Loew’s, 131 F Supp at 176 n 31. 
 197 Campbell, 510 US at 572–73. 
 198 Id at 583. 
 199 Id at 592. 
 200 Id at 579. 
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The “nub” of parody, according to the Court, is “the use of some 
elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, 
at least in part, comments on that author’s works,”201 while satire 
“has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original 
composition [but rather] merely uses [it] to get attention or to 
avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.”202 
The Campbell decision changed preexisting understandings 
of fair use in two important respects. First, it emphasized the im-
portance of transformativeness in fair use determinations—an as-
pect that led to a revolution in the way fair use cases were de-
cided.203 Second, the Court effectively created a “safe harbor” for 
parodies within fair use; although the Court never said that par-
odies are per se fair, commentators and courts alike understood 
the instruction they received from the Court as suggestive of this 
outcome.204 The reaction to the ruling was swift. After Campbell, 
defendants have sought to emphasize that their use, whatever it 
might be, is transformative and therefore fair.205 Likewise, de-
fendants in fair use cases have gone to great distances to persuade 
courts that their putatively infringing works were parodies, and 
whenever they were successful, a fair use ruling ensued.206 Practi-
cally, parodies are almost guaranteed a fair use finding. Strikingly, 
 
 201 Campbell, 510 US at 580. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Michelle B. Lee and Erin M. Hickey, The Changing Landscape of Fair Use: ‘Trans-
formative’ Is Key (Law360, Apr 22, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3VY6-8ZJ3 (noting 
that “courts began to increasingly emphasize whether a use was ‘transformative’ after the 
Campbell decision”). See also Sag, 73 Ohio St L J at 76–77 (cited in note 8). 
 204 See, for example, Burnett v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, 491 F Supp 2d 962, 
968–69 (CD Cal 2007) (interpreting Campbell to hold that if a work is likely to be reason-
ably perceived as a parody, then it is a fair use); Mattel Inc v Walking Mountain Produc-
tions, 353 F3d 792, 806 (9th Cir 2003); Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co, 268 F3d 
1257, 1268 (11th Cir 2001); Lyons Partnership, LP v Giannoulas, 14 F Supp 2d 947, 955 
(ND Tex 1998). See also Samuelson, 77 Fordham L Rev at 2550–51 (cited in note 134); 
Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 Wash L Rev 815, 821 (2015) (“Although 
the Court in Campbell expressly declined to adopt a presumption that parodies of copy-
righted works were fair uses, the parody case law after Campbell has resulted in many 
fair use rulings. . . . [This trend suggests] that parodies are de facto presumptively fair.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 205 See, for example, Google, 954 F Supp 2d at 290–91; HathiTrust, 755 F3d at 97–98; 
Cariou, 714 F3d at 698–99; Perfect 10, 508 F3d at 1164–67; Blanch, 467 F3d at 251–53; 
Kelly v Arriba Soft Corp, 336 F3d 811, 818–20 (9th Cir 2003); On Davis v Gap, Inc, 246 
F3d 152, 174–76 (2d Cir 2001); Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc v Carol Publishing Group, 
Inc, 150 F3d 132, 142–43 (2d Cir 1998). 
 206 See, for example, Brownmark Films, LLC v Comedy Partners, 800 F Supp 2d 991, 
1001–02 (ED Wis 2011) (holding that South Park’s partial use of a music video was parody 
and fair use); Burnett, 491 F Supp 2d at 971–72, 974–75; Suntrust Bank, 268 F3d at 1276; 
Leibovitz v Paramount Pictures Corp, 137 F3d 109, 117 (2d Cir 1998); Lyons Partnership, 
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satires are not entitled to the same status and are treated like all 
other putatively infringing works—that is, they are subject to the 
balancing test of § 107 and they are often denied fair use.207 
Indeed, in many cases, the entirety of the court’s decision 
turns on whether the allegedly infringing work is best viewed as 
a parody or as a satire. Sometimes, the alleged infringer attempts 
to shape the likely outcome with labeling. Consider the case of Dr. 
Seuss Enterprises, LP v Penguin Books USA, Inc.208 Writing under 
the pen name “Dr. Juice,” Alan Katz authored a book called The 
Cat Not in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, which, as the district 
court noted, mimicked the distinctive style of the Dr. Seuss209 fam-
ily of works in rhyme, illustration, and packaging.210 The district 
court rejected Katz’s claim that his book was a parody of Dr. 
Seuss’s works that could copy from the Dr. Seuss books under the 
rubric of fair use. Instead, the court found Katz’s book to be an 
unprotected satire that made “no [ ] attempt to comment upon the 
text or themes of The Cat in the Hat” and other Dr. Seuss books.211 
Indeed, said the Court of Appeals, the use of Dr. Seuss’s work was 
“pure shtick” intended merely to retell the story of O.J. Simpson’s 
murder trial.212 
Viewed from our vantage point, the Supreme Court got it back-
ward in Campbell. Under our test, it is political satires that should 
most obviously be considered prima facie fair, whereas it is less ob-
vious that parodies and other types of works that function primar-
ily as criticisms of the original should receive solicitous treatment. 
Political parodies, such as Saturday Night Live’s famous spoof of 
Sarah Palin’s interview with Katie Couric,213 are clearly political 
 
14 F Supp 2d at 955 (holding that a mascot’s use of the “Barney dance” at sporting events 
was a parody and fair use). 
 207 See, for example, Blanch, 467 F3d at 254–55, 259 (considering the work more of a 
satire, yet favoring the defendant after considering the four factors); Williams v Columbia 
Broadcasting Systems, Inc, 57 F Supp 2d 961, 969 (CD Cal 1999); Columbia Pictures In-
dustries, Inc v Miramax Films Corp, 11 F Supp 2d 1179, 1187 (CD Cal 1998); Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises, LP v Penguin Books USA, Inc, 924 F Supp 1559, 1569–70 (SD Cal 1996) (hold-
ing that a work’s nature as satire was insufficient for a fair use defense, but that parody 
was sufficient). 
 208 924 F Supp 1559 (SD Cal 1996). 
 209 Dr. Seuss was the pen name of Theodor S. Geisel. Id at 1561. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id at 1569. 
 212 Dr. Seuss Enterprises, LP v Penguin Books USA, Inc, 109 F3d 1394, 1401–03 (9th 
Cir 1997). 
 213 Andrew O’Hehir, Tina Fey’s Sarah Palin: When “Saturday Night Live” Finally Got 
Political Satire Right (Salon, Feb 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/SYQ8-ENYS. 
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speech and play a central role in democratic self-governance. Par-
odies that make light of the original work, like book reviews and 
other critical works, may also fall within the scope of fair use,214 but 
their demand for the protection of fair use is less pressing. Many 
parodies, however, serve nonpolitical purposes and thus do not pro-
vide as substantial a follow-on benefit to society. 
2. Personal use. 
Personal uses of works have enjoyed a mixed reception in fair 
use jurisprudence. The high mark of personal uses, without 
doubt, was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sony. 
As previously noted, in Sony the Supreme Court ruled that 
the practice of home consumers recording programs for their own 
later viewing—“time shifting”—was a protected fair use.215 This 
would appear to anchor the idea that even large-scale infringe-
ments—including copying of entire works—would fall within the 
bounds of fair use so long as the copying were for personal, non-
commercial uses. 
Yet notwithstanding this ruling, subsequent attempts to an-
chor personal use copying as fair uses were far less successful. 
The clearest example of the mixed fate of personal uses in fair use 
litigation can be found in a number of attempts to win fair use 
protection for “space shifting”—the copying of works from one me-
dium to a different medium for personal, noncommercial uses. 
This occurs, for instance, when someone records music from an 
older format (such as a CD) to a newer format (such as an MP3 
file).216 
Perhaps the most resounding failure of the personal fair use 
arguments was the Napster litigation.217 Napster was a company 
that created and marketed software and network services that 
permitted users to transfer and share files through the internet.218 
Napster featured two central innovations. First, it employed a 
peer-to-peer transfer technology that permitted users to transfer 
files directly to one another without having to go through the cen-
tral server. This eliminated bottlenecks and sped up file trans-
fers. Second, Napster offered directory software that permitted 
 
 214 See Suntrust Bank, 268 F3d at 1267–76; Leibovitz, 137 F3d at 114–17. 
 215 Sony, 464 US at 456. 
 216 A&M Records, Inc v Napster, Inc, 114 F Supp 2d 896, 904 (ND Cal 2000). 
 217 Id at 896, affd in part and revd in part, 239 F3d 1004 (9th Cir 2001), on remand, 
2001 WL 777005 (ND Cal), affd, 284 F3d 1091 (9th Cir 2002). 
 218 A&M Records, 114 F Supp 2d at 901. 
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users to locate files of other users and initiate downloads.219 Nap-
ster was aimed, in particular, at consumers of digital music 
files.220 Napster permitted millions of users to obtain digital copies 
of copyrighted music from one another without ever obtaining a 
license for the distribution or copying.221 Music companies sued 
Napster for its facilitation of and direct involvement in the in-
fringing acts.222 
Napster’s legal strategy was based on the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Sony. Napster claimed that one of the main uses of Nap-
ster software was “space shifting”—the practice of copying from 
obsolete format to usable digital format music to which the con-
sumer had already purchased a license.223 Of course, it was not 
Napster that directly engaged in copying. Rather, it was Napster 
users who did so. Napster users who wanted to space shift their 
music from computer to computer would make MP3 copies of their 
older CD formats and then use Napster to transfer the files. Nap-
ster claimed this was a near-perfect analogue to the Sony case. As 
in Sony, Napster claimed that it was doing nothing more than 
distributing an article of commerce that was sometimes used by 
consumers for forbidden copying, but was at other times used for 
permissible fair use copying.224 The key for Napster’s success was 
to convince the court that “space shifting” was, like “time shift-
ing,” a fair use. On this point, unfortunately, Napster failed.225 
The district court dismissed the space-shifting argument on 
multiple grounds. It found that the amount of pure space shifting 
was small, such that even if space shifting were a personal use 
recognized as fair, Napster could not enjoy the benefit of the Sony 
ruling to protect itself from other infringing activities by Napster 
and its users.226 But the district court went beyond simply reject-
ing the applicability of Sony. The court cast doubt on whether 
space shifting should be recognized as a fair use at all. While not 
entirely ruling out the possibility that space shifting might be a 
fair use, the court rejected several of the arguments that were 
proffered in favor of considering space shifting a fair use, and it 
 
 219 See A&M Records, 239 F3d at 1011–12. 
 220 Id at 1017. 
 221 Id at 1015. 
 222 Id at 1011, 1013. 
 223 A&M Records, 239 F3d at 1019. 
 224 Id at 1021. 
 225 Id at 1019. 
 226 A&M Records, 114 F Supp 2d at 904–05. 
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carefully refrained from ever endorsing the claim that space shift-
ing is fair.227 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that space shift-
ing should not be viewed as a fair use, at least in the context of 
Napster’s business. The court emphasized that, given the way 
that Napster’s technology worked, any user who utilized Napster 
to space shift would necessarily expose the “shifted” files to other 
Napster users who would wish to make their own copies.228 
The Napster ruling has engendered a great deal of discussion, 
as well as some controversy.229 However, space shifting has not 
won general endorsement as fair use in case law since then, not-
withstanding the plausible argument that space shifting is a 
quintessential personal, noncommercial use. From the perspec-
tive of our theory, this makes sense. It may well be that Congress 
has no interest in barring unauthorized, noncommercial, personal 
uses. However, such personal uses do not fit into the broader pur-
poses of fair use as we understand them. By definition, personal 
uses are not likely to produce widespread follow-on utility to non-
users. While the doctrine is underinclusive of particularly high-
value personal uses, these uses are so rare that they need not fac-
tor into the doctrine. 
This is not to say that there can be no argument for limiting 
enforcement of copyright against purely noncommercial personal 
uses. In fact, there are three possible arguments. First, given 
what appear to be strong social norms in favor of viewing such 
uses as permitted,230 it may be wise to limit enforcement in order 
to keep the law in line with widespread social expectations. Sec-
ond, many noncommercial personal uses will be sufficiently small 
that transaction costs may prevent bargaining between the user 
of the work and the copyright owner, even though it would be so-
cially optimal for the work to be used. And third, the promise of 
 
 227 Id at 915–16. 
 228 A&M Records, 239 F3d at 1019. 
 229 See, for example, Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: 
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U Chi L Rev 263, 298–311 
(2002); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of 
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 Va L Rev 505, 576–82 (2003). 
 230 See Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Oppor-
tunity for Privacy Protection, 51 Vill L Rev 921, 944 (2006); Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: 
How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity 
66–68, 124–26 (Penguin 2004); Steven A. Hetcher, The Music Industry’s Failed Attempt to 
Influence File Sharing Norms, 7 Vand J Enter L & Prac 10, 11 (2004); Ann Bartow, Elec-
trifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 Vill L Rev 13, 95 
(2003); Dan L. Burk and Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management 
Systems, 15 Harv J L & Tech 41, 65 (2001). 
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nonenforcement may be necessary to encourage the development 
and adoption of new technologies. For instance, purchasers of new 
music-storage technology (such as dedicated digital music players 
like the iPod) might want some assurance that their CD collect-
ions will not become completely obsolete before they purchase the 
new technology. 
The strength of these arguments will vary by technology. The 
social norms surrounding the copying of music for personal enjoy-
ment may not apply to artwork, for example. Transaction costs 
will not only differ by technology; they will also change over time. 
It is now evident—though it was not so evident twenty years 
ago—that it is cost-effective to sell listeners digital recordings of 
music by the song. And, at least in some cases, no assurances to 
consumers were necessary to encourage them to adopt new tech-
nologies. DVDs supplanted videocassettes without giving con-
sumers the ability or the right to transfer their recorded material 
from videotape to DVD. DVDs, in turn, are being supplanted by 
streaming video, again without the legal ability to transfer rights. 
The optimal legal treatment for such personal uses may, there-
fore, vary by technology. And, indeed, the strongest judicial pro-
nouncement in favor of legal protection of space shifting as within 
the rights of users as a personal, noncommercial use came in Re-
cording Industry Association of America v Diamond Multimedia 
Systems Inc,231 a case that construed a provision of the Audio 
Home Recording Act of 1992232 (AHRA) that specifically permitted 
the making of personal copies of digital music in certain circum-
stances.233 While that case found such space shifting to be a “par-
adigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with 
the purposes of the Act,” the court did not rule that all noncom-
mercial, personal uses are fair uses.234 
3. Fan fiction. 
Fan fiction provides an interesting application of our theory. 
For our purposes, the category of fan fiction encompasses noncom-
mercial production—and often dissemination—of a broad range 
of derivative works that rely on prior successful works. The Harry 
Potter and The Hunger Games book series, the Star Wars movie 
series, and the Star Trek television series are just a few well-known 
 
 231 180 F3d 1072 (9th Cir 1999). 
 232 Pub L No 102-563, 106 Stat 4237, codified at 17 USC § 1001 et seq. 
 233 Recording Industry Association of America, 180 F3d at 1079. 
 234 Id. 
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examples of works that engendered a significant body of derivative 
works by consumers.235 The unlicensed derivative works, in many 
cases, are the vehicles for extending enjoyment of the fictional 
works to contexts that the original creators would never have 
thought to explore. 
Some scholars have called for the creation of a new legal priv-
ilege for fan fiction on grounds of self-expression,236 harnessing 
cultural theory to support this initiative. Others have sought to 
assimilate fan fiction within existing fair use doctrine. Professors 
Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, for example, have con-
tended that fan fiction should be entitled to a status of a presump-
tively fair use on the grounds that it is parodic and highly trans-
formative.237 Using this rationale, they have suggested that even 
commercial fan fiction should be considered fair.238 
Our model offers a more nuanced and, we believe, clearer po-
sition. On our view, which once again focuses on the production of 
dispersed nonpecuniary benefits to nonusers, fan fiction should 
enjoy a presumptively fair status only if it is noncommercial and 
only if it is disseminated to the public. Hence, noncommercial lit-
erary, musical, and audiovisual adaptations of works should be 
considered fair, as long as they are made available to the public. 
The same is true of noncommercial parties and costume parades. 
Commercial merchandise, video games, and other derivative 
works that are produced for profit would not be sheltered under 
our theory. 
IV.  EXPLORING THE INTERFACE WITH OTHER THEORIES 
Having presented our view of fair use in theory and in doc-
trine, we turn in this Part to an exploration of the way our pro-
posed view of fair use interacts with related theoretical scholar-
ship in the fields of property and copyright. 
 
 235 See generally Karen Hellekson and Kristina Busse, eds, Fan Fiction and Fan Com-
munities in the Age of the Internet (McFarland 2006) (describing the plethora of fan fiction 
stories derived from different original works). 
 236 See, for example, Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a 
New Common Law, 17 Loyola LA Enter L Rev 651, 655 (1997). 
 237 Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder, Everyone’s a Superhero: A Cultural Theory 
of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 Cal L Rev 597, 615–17 (2007). 
 238 Id at 616. 
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A. Free Speech, the First Amendment, and Copyright 
We begin by looking at the obvious connections between our 
theory and broader theories of the importance of free expression 
in society, particularly in the context of the First Amendment and 
its guarantee of freedom of speech. A number of scholars have 
noted that there is some obvious tension between the strategies 
chosen by free speech law and copyright law to encourage expres-
sion.239 Copyright law seeks to support expression by restricting 
its use; free speech law seeks to support it by sweeping away re-
strictions. As we have noted, copyright law aims to give authors 
the opportunity to realize pecuniary gain from expressions they 
have created by giving them exclusive property rights over vari-
ous uses of the expressions.240 Free speech law, by contrast, aims 
to expand the scope and reach of various kinds of expression by 
preventing government interference with the expressive activity.241 
Many scholars have tried to explain where the boundary be-
tween these two strategies lies. In particular, they have explored 
when concerns of free speech should trump copyright law and per-
mit unfettered expression that utilizes copyrighted speech.242 It is 
undeniable that the two bodies of law adopt fundamentally oppo-
site approaches to promoting speech in society. Professor Rebecca 
Tushnet has provocatively labeled copyright “book burning man-
dated by law.”243 Professor Julie Cohen has labeled copyright a 
 
 239 See, for example, Bauer, 67 Wash & Lee L Rev at 873–78 (cited in note 157); David 
McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U Pitt L Rev 
281, 287–91 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of 
Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 Loyola LA L Rev 83, 95–
97 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 
54 Stan L Rev 1, 12–20 (2001); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech 
Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance 
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 BC L Rev 1, 4–27 (2000); Patterson, 40 
Vand L Rev at 33–36 (cited in note 157); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellec-
tual Property: Some Thoughts after Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Houston L 
Rev 697, 702–10 (2003). 
 240 See Sterk, 94 Mich L Rev at 1198–1204, 1207–08 (cited in note 12); William M. 
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 13 
(Belknap 2003). 
 241 See Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine 
Speech, 82 Fordham L Rev 1629, 1666 (2014); Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Ex-
pression, 88 Yale L J 1105, 1109 (1979). 
 242 See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 
61 Hastings L J 1083 (2010); Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on 
Copyright Law, 35 Hofstra L Rev 1169 (2007); Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (cited in note 
157); Patterson, 40 Vand L Rev 1 (cited in note 157); Bauer, 67 Wash & Lee L Rev 831 
(cited in note 157). 
 243 Tushnet, 114 Yale L J at 540 (cited in note 61). 
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“form of censorship.”244 Several scholars have suggested broader 
exemptions to copyright protections in order to accommodate free 
speech concerns.245 
The natural starting point for exploring this scholarship re-
mains Professor Melville Nimmer’s classic 1970 article, Does Co-
pyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech 
and Press?, which first identified the “largely ignored paradox” of 
the Copyright Act forbidding speech.246 Several decades later, Pro-
fessor Netanel picked up these themes in a number of works, in-
cluding a book247 and several articles.248 Netanel has argued that 
much of modern copyright law exceeds constitutional free speech 
limits.249 Netanel’s critique is not based on the fair use doctrine, 
per se; rather, it looks holistically at all copyright law, shining 
light on numerous doctrines such as the tests for determining 
nonliteral infringing copying.250 After the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Golan,251 Netanel argued that the Supreme Court had adopted 
Nimmer’s proposed “definitional balancing” by constitutionaliz-
ing the fair use doctrine and what is called the idea-expression 
dichotomy.252 However, Netanel was less interested in sketching 
out the scope of the fair use doctrine as required by the constitu-
tional guarantee of free speech.253 
Tushnet’s justly celebrated Copy This Essay: How Fair Use 
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It is the 
 
 244 Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Privacy and Censorship of the Internet, 8 Seton Hall 
Const L J 693, 693 (1998). 
 245 See generally Chemerinsky, 36 Loyola LA L Rev 83 (cited in note 239); C. Edwin 
Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand L Rev 891 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, 
The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 Yale L J 1 (2012); Netanel, 
54 Stan L Rev 1 (cited in note 239); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 NYU L Rev 354 (1999). 
 246 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of 
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L Rev 1180, 1181 (1970). Another notable article pub-
lished that same year was Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum 
L Rev 983 (1970), which touched on many of the same issues. 
 247 See generally Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox (cited in note 157). 
 248 See generally Netanel, 60 UCLA L Rev 1082 (cited in note 87); Netanel, 54 Stan L 
Rev 1 (cited in note 239); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our 
System of Free Expression, 53 Vand L Rev 1879 (2000); Netanel, 51 Vand L Rev 217 (cited 
in note 98); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L 
J 283 (1996).  
 249 See Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox at 109–53 (cited in note 157). 
 250 Id at 59–60. 
 251 See text accompanying notes 82–86. 
 252 Netanel, 60 UCLA L Rev at 1085–86 (cited in note 87). 
 253 Id at 1112–13. Netanel did note several troubling aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Harper & Row. Id at 1105. 
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most direct exploration of how fair use doctrine must be viewed 
in light of free speech concerns. Tushnet has celebrated the focus 
of fair use doctrine in recent years on transformativeness; she has 
agreed that transformative uses should generally be viewed as 
fair. At the same time, she has argued that transformativeness 
cannot be the sine qua non of fair use doctrine, as it is excessively 
narrow. Even with her recommendation that personal, noncom-
mercial uses also be considered fair uses, she has acknowledged 
that she “[has] no [ ] solution to offer,”254 adding that “[a] judicial 
attitude of tolerance toward copying that is not quantitatively 
large would help when fair use cases were actually litigated, but 
any standard would be difficult to codify and would still subject 
many uses to a chilling uncertainty.”255 
While our Article touches on many of the same concerns as 
the fascinating free speech–copyright literature, our aim is differ-
ent. We do not attempt to draw the boundary lines between the 
concerns of free speech and copyright. Rather, we seek to expli-
cate the proper scope of the fair use doctrine. That said, we 
acknowledge that our approach may contribute to understanding 
how to harmonize the concerns of copyright law with those of free 
speech law. We argue that our doctrine offers an easier way to 
accommodate the tension—one that has been alluded to by the 
Supreme Court in the years since Tushnet wrote her essay. Es-
sentially, our version of the fair use doctrine would involve a 
broadening and a reinterpretation of the doctrine that would 
cover enough speech to take care of the free speech concerns. 
B. Spillovers 
Another body of scholarly work whose concerns clearly over-
lap with ours is one addressing the issue of positive externalities. 
In an impressive body of work, Professor Brett Frischmann, 
alone256 and with Professor Mark Lemley,257 has discussed the im-
portant phenomenon of positive externalities (“spillovers,” in his 
terminology) and its importance for policymaking in the realm of 
intellectual property. The gist of Frischmann’s theory is that 
 
 254 Tushnet, 114 Yale L J at 587 (cited in note 61). 
 255 Id at 588. 
 256 See generally Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copy-
right Law, 3 Rev L & Econ 649 (2007); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Con-
ceptual Boundaries, 51 Wm & Mary L Rev 801 (2009). 
 257 See generally Brett M. Frischmann and Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum L 
Rev 257 (2007). 
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since intellectual goods produce many important spillovers for 
society, it would be unwise to grant strong protection to copy-
right owners lest the all-important spillovers be lost.258 Our the-
ory touches on many of the concerns addressed by the work of 
Frischmann and others—such as Lemley,259 Professor Katherine 
Strandburg, Professor Michael Meurer,260 and Professor Michael 
Carroll261—but as far as the bottom line is concerned, our theory 
diverges from these in critical respects. 
Not only does our theory not depend on the concept of spill-
overs, but also we believe that the presence of spillovers actually 
mitigates in favor of stronger author rights, all things being 
equal. The accepted lore in economics is that all externalities—
negative and positive alike—present a similar challenge.262 When 
actors fail to take account of negative externalities, they are likely 
to carry out too much of the activity. When it is positive external-
ities that they overlook, actors are likely to carry out too little of 
the activity.263 A central, though by no means exclusive, strategy 
for countering over- or underproduction of an activity is internal-
ization.264 When the actor has to fully bear the costs of negative 
externalities and may fully realize the gains of positive external-
ities, the actor’s cost-benefit analysis will mirror society’s, and the 
actor will undertake the socially optimal amount of the activity. 
As Professor Harold Demsetz famously observed, property rights 
implement a strategy of internalization by giving an owner a set 
of exclusive rights regarding an asset.265 This is true even if the 
asset in question is intangible. It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
Professor Polk Wagner has pointed out that in the intellectual 
property domain, stronger protection may actually create more 
information for the public than weak protection.266 
 
 258 See Frischmann, 3 Rev L & Econ at 669–72 (cited in note 256). 
 259 See Lemley, 83 Tex L Rev at 1046–69 (cited in note 99). 
 260 See Michael J. Meurer and Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Carrots and Sticks: A 
Model of Nonobviousness, 12 Lewis & Clark L Rev 547, 558–65 (2008). 
 261 See Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring 
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 Ohio St L J 1361, 1419–21 (2009). 
 262  See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J Legal Stud 21, 22 (2009); 
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 347–57 (1967) 
(arguing that property rights arise to effect internalization of externalities, both positive 
and negative); Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested 
Benefits, 108 Mich L Rev 189, 190 (2009). 
 263 Dari-Mattiacci, 38 J Legal Stud at 22 (cited in note 262). 
 264 Id. 
 265 Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev at 349–50 (cited in note 262). 
 266 See R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum L Rev 995, 1024 (2003). 
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To be sure, as Professor Coase, Demsetz, and others have ob-
served, absolute property rights are not a panacea.267 Setting up 
and enforcing property rights is not costless.268 Regulation or 
other nonproperty methods may prove more cost-effective in in-
centivizing the optimal level of activity.269 Likewise, the initial al-
location of property rights may prove “sticky” as a result of high 
transaction costs, making property rights inferior at times to reg-
ulated access. As we noted, the nonrivalrous nature of consuming 
intellectual property goods may make it worthwhile to allocate 
certain uses directly to users.270 Indeed, as Demsetz pointed out 
in his response to the literature on spillovers, the desirability of 
property rights is highly context dependent.271 From an economic 
standpoint, there is no universally correct approach. The appro-
priate response to externalities depends on the relative costs and 
expected benefits of different methods of incentivizing behavior. 
But certainly one cannot conclude from the mere presence of pos-
itive externalities that it is societally beneficial to deny the owner 
the right to capture the value of those externalities. 
The theory we develop here is independent of the concept of 
spillovers. Ours is an allocative theory that strives to divide uses 
of expressive works such that certain types of uses will initially 
be allocated to consumers in order to save on transaction costs 
and encourage uses otherwise favored by the state. On our vision, 
certain uses of works are of such great significance to the public 
that they must be allocated to it, at least in principle. We allow 
courts the power to change the initial allocation in appropriate 
cases, but not because of the existence of spillovers. Rather, courts 
can take away uses from the public and shift them to authors if 
doing so is absolutely necessary to preserve incentives to create. 
In this sense, our theory converges with the market-failure theo-
ry: like Professor Gordon,272 we believe that uses that threaten to 
undermine incentives to create should be judicially reapportioned. 
 
 267 See Coase, 3 J L & Econ at 15 (cited in note 32); Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev at 354–
59 (cited in note 262); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability 
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv L Rev 713, 741–44 (1996). 
 268 Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev at 353–54 (cited in note 262). 
 269 See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 NC L Rev 87, 129–39 (2004) (propos-
ing a regulatory approach to copyright, instead of a property rights approach); Kaplow and 
Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 741–44 (cited in note 267) (arguing that, in some instances, 
liability rules may be less costly than property rules for copyright enforcement). 
 270 See Part II.B. See also Lunney, 82 BU L Rev at 979, 993–94 (cited in note 11). 
 271 Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of “Toward a Theory of Property Rights”, 4 
Rev L & Econ 127, 128–29 (2008). 
 272 See generally Gordon, 50 J Copyright Society USA 149 (cited in note 7). 
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C. Other Fair Use Theories 
Fair use is not only one of the most litigated topics in the law, 
but it is also one of the most frequently commented on.273 It is 
simply not possible within the scope of a law review article to give 
proper credit and acknowledgement to the many invaluable scho-
larly contributions to thinking about fair use. That said, there are 
only a small number of comprehensive attempts at rethinking the 
theory behind the fair use doctrine and recrafting the doctrine ac-
cordingly. In this Section, we distinguish our comprehensive at-
tempt from two others—one by Professor William Fisher, and an-
other one by one of us. We also address doctrinal analyses by 
Professor Glynn Lunney and Professor Samuelson that share 
some interesting features with our approach in this Article. 
1. Fair use and allocative efficiency. 
In his ambitious 1988 article, published after the controversial 
Harper & Row decision by the Supreme Court, Fisher suggests two 
possible lines along which fair use doctrine might be reformulated. 
One possible approach is using the fair use doctrine to promote cer-
tain views of the “good society.”274 The other, which is much closer 
to our concerns in this Article, is allocative efficiency.275 
In suggesting an allocative-efficiency approach to the fair use 
doctrine, Fisher shares our basic assumption: that the fair use 
doctrine aims to allocate certain uses directly to the public in or-
der to reduce the inefficiency of the copyright owner’s monopoly 
power, while still retaining the minimum incentives necessary for 
the creation of copyrighted works.276 However, Fisher chooses a 
more direct strategy for allocating uses to the public. Rather than 
identify categories of presumptive fair uses, as we have done, 
Fisher calls for measuring all potential uses of all similar works 
whenever a fair use is claimed. For each of these uses, Fisher calls 
on judges to estimate two items: the amount of incentives that 
would be created for the author if the use were found unfair (that 
is, the profit the author could realize by selling the use) and the 
societal-efficiency loss that would be engendered by finding the 
 
 273 Beebe, 156 U Pa L Rev at 552 (cited in note 1) (noting that “the concept of fair use 
. . . ha[s] attracted an enormous amount of scholarly attention”); Goldstein, 31 Colum J L 
& Arts at 433 (cited in note 134) (describing fair use as “the great white whale of American 
copyright law”). 
 274 Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev at 1695–96 (cited in note 97). 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id at 1715–17. 
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use unfair (that is, the loss to society resulting from the owner not 
licensing a use).277 A high ratio between the two would indicate 
that the use is not fair; a low ratio would show that the use is fair. 
The cutoff point between high and low should be set at the use 
with the highest marginal aggregate social gain (gain to society 
from creation minus loss to society from monopoly control over 
uses).278 
Fisher’s approach is obviously appealing in that it seeks to 
reach a more precise allocation of rights and privileges between 
author and public. If Fisher’s method could be followed by judges, 
fair use could achieve precise allocative efficiency, ensuring that 
authors receive as much incentive as necessary to create while 
leaving for the public whatever is unnecessary. 
Unfortunately, Fisher’s method also appears to be impossible 
to implement in the real world. It requires of judges extensive 
knowledge of the entire field of creative works, potential uses, and 
values to society. These factors change over time, so judges could 
not consistently rely on prior rulings; essentially, each judge fac-
ing a fair use decision would have to recalculate and set the bar 
anew. It is not surprising, therefore, that even Fisher acknowl-
edges that the framework he constructs is impractical.279 Thus, 
while Fisher’s approach is important for understanding the trade-
offs involved in fair use decisions, his proposal offers little pur-
chase to judges and actors. 
Interestingly, Fisher’s suggestions for a fair use doctrine ori-
ented around promoting the aims of a “good society” come closer 
to our doctrinal approach because they privilege certain kinds of 
uses, such as education.280 
2. Fair use and custom. 
A different approach at regularizing fair use doctrine aims 
to anchor it in custom. A 2004 article by Professor Michael 
Madison,281 as well as a 1997 article by one of us,282 suggests that 
fair use doctrine can be reorganized around existing social prac-
tices. The 1997 article proposes a focused analysis on a particular 
 
 277 Id. 
 278 Fisher, 101 Harv L Rev at 1715–17 (cited in note 97). 
 279 Id at 1739. 
 280 Id at 1769–72. 
 281 Madison, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1622–77 (cited in note 124). 
 282 See Parchomovsky, 3 Legal Theory at 349 (cited in note 37). 
01 BELL&PARCHOMOVSKY_ART_IC (MLM) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2016  1:49 PM 
2016] The Dual-Grant Theory of Fair Use 1115 
 
social concern, namely, the reciprocity of risk.283 Fair use, on this 
understanding, should shield infringements by users who are 
themselves authors whose own works can be similarly in-
fringed.284 This is not as narrow a reading of fair use as it might 
seem on first blush, given the low bar for the creation of protected 
works under copyright. Indeed, it would be unusual if users of 
copyrighted works could not be considered authors. The article 
therefore proposes limiting fair use findings to users or authors 
whose practices fall within extant societal norms.285 In those 
cases, the risks imposed by the purported fair use can be consid-
ered to be the kinds of reciprocal risks that escape legal liability, 
since penalizing such risks would do little more than incur ad-
ministrative costs.286 
Madison’s piece undertakes a far broader review of the state 
of fair use law, though its ambitions for rewriting fair use law are 
more limited. Madison’s analysis is grounded in the case law, and 
it abstracts from the cases to broader principles. In general, 
Madison argues that fair use cases fall into patterns clustered 
around certain social contexts and associated customs, and that 
fair use law should aim to enforce societal expectations of legiti-
mate use.287 Reciprocity is important to Madison, but “the pattern-
oriented approach does not require evidence of reciprocal behav-
ior as such in all cases.”288 Rather, “[i]t requires commonality of 
behavior and expectation.”289 
In this Article, our approach is different. We do not seek to 
identify extant societal behavior that ought to be protected 
through fair use doctrine, nor do we seek to enforce it through 
reinterpretation of fair use. Our organizing principle for the law 
of fair use is not reciprocity of risk or the assumption of efficient 
societal norms. Rather, it is the centrality of the fair use doctrine 
for allocating copyright-related rights and privileges efficiently. 
3. Presumptive fair use. 
Another interesting perspective on the fair use doctrine can 
be found in Lunney’s 2002 article on the Sony decision and its 
 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id at 370–71. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Parchomovsky, 3 Legal Theory at 370–71 (cited in note 37). 
 287 Madison, 45 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1687 (cited in note 124). 
 288 Id at 1635. 
 289 Id. 
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proper place in fair use analysis.290 Nominally, Lunney’s article 
aims only to correct a long-standing misinterpretation of the Sony 
decision. In fact, Lunney’s article strives for something far more 
ambitious. Presenting fair use as the means for balancing bet-
ween copyright’s conflicting goals of incentivizing creation and 
encouraging use of creative works, Lunney argues that essen-
tially all uses should be presumed fair.291 In Lunney’s account, the 
reason that the time shifting in Sony was a fair use was not be-
cause it was small enough that it was likely to be foiled by trans-
action costs.292 Rather, it was fair because, like all uses, it was to 
be considered fair unless the copyright owner could show that the 
use caused great loss to the owner—which in that case was a bur-
den the copyright owner could not meet.293 
In general, Lunney suggests that the proper test for fair use 
ought to presume that all uses are fair unless proved otherwise, 
and also suggests that owners should be able to prove that uses 
are unfair only by demonstrating both that the use has an adverse 
effect on the market for the creation, and that the adverse effect 
would affect marginal incentives for production.294 Lunney’s ver-
sion of fair use, in other words, is even broader than ours, as it 
makes all uses of copyrighted works presumptively fair. Nonethe-
less, Lunney’s approach shares a great deal with ours. Like us, 
Lunney views fair use as an allocative tool for balancing the in-
centive effects of granting rights to authors with the benefits of 
widespread use of works created by public privileges to unlicensed 
use of creative works. Like us, Lunney suggests that fair use doc-
trine can best be shaped to this allocative function by viewing at 
least some uses as presumptively fair.295 However, we believe that 
a fair use doctrine that views all uses as presumptively fair 
strikes the wrong allocative balance. 
An interesting contrast with Lunney’s approach is provided by 
Samuelson’s Unbundling Fair Uses. As noted above, Samuelson 
emphasizes the degree to which extant fair use law is clustered 
 
 290 See generally Lunney, 82 BU L Rev 975 (cited in note 11). 
 291 See id at 996, 1022–23. 
 292 See id at 976–77, 992–96. 
 293 Id at 982, 991–92. 
 294 Lunney, 82 BU L Rev at 981–85, 999 (cited in note 11). 
 295 Others have suggested more limited use of the presumption of fair use. See gener-
ally, for example, Greenberg, 85 U Colo L Rev 53 (cited in note 8); Ned Snow, Proving Fair 
Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 Cardozo L Rev 1781 (2010); Samuelson, 77 
Fordham L Rev 2537 (cited in note 134). 
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around what she calls “policy-relevant” patterns.296 In privileging 
some uses by giving them the status of presumptive fair uses, 
while denying that status to other uses, our proposal echoes a pat-
tern of extant fair use law that is both identified and lauded by 
Samuelson. Samuelson cautiously suggests that existing fair use 
law is normatively sound, as it befits treatment of copyright as 
“limited monopoly.”297 She too proposes limited burden shifting, 
writing that 
[g]iven the important role that fair use plays in mediating 
tensions between copyright law and the First Amendment 
and other constitutional values, it would be appropriate for 
the burden of showing unfairness to be on the copyright 
owner. . . . At the very least, copyright owners should bear 
the burden of proving unfairness in free speech/expression, 
personal use, and litigation use cases.298 
While neither Lunney nor Samuelson replicates our theoret-
ical approach or doctrinal prescriptions, the doctrinal implica-
tions of their suggestions belong to the same family of approaches 
as ours. 
CONCLUSION 
Fair use is the principal mechanism employed by copyright 
law to balance the interests of authors and copyright-reliant in-
dustries against those of the public. It is therefore not surprising 
that it has attracted considerable attention from copyright theor-
ists, who offer myriad theories to justify and explicate this re-
markable doctrine. 
In this Article, we have offered a novel approach to the fair 
use doctrine based on two central insights. First, we show that 
the fair use doctrine is best understood as an allocative tool that 
grants use categories directly to users to ensure efficient utiliza-
tion of the rights associated with copyright. Second, we show that 
the categories allocated to users by the fair use doctrine should be 
those that provide follow-on users with significant nonpecuniary 
benefits. 
Our novel approach to the fair use doctrine can provide some 
needed clarity and coherence to a doctrine that has puzzled schol-
ars and confounded courts. Naturally, in a scholarly space rife 
 
 296 Samuelson, 77 Fordham L Rev at 2541–42 (cited in note 134). 
 297 Id at 2617–18. 
 298 Id (citation omitted). 
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with many outstanding preexisting contributions, it is impossible 
to be completely innovative. Indeed, as we point out throughout 
the Article, on various dimensions our theory overlaps with preex-
isting ones. Like many others before us, we also clearly benefit 
from standing on the shoulders of giants. Yet the core theoretical 
thesis, as well as the enumeration of fair and unfair use categor-
ies we advance, breaks new ground and can introduce a great deal 
of coherence and clarity into judicial determinations and aca-
demic discussions of the most remarkable doctrine in the entire 
world of copyright. 
